本文認為，「既有強權美國 vs. 崛起強權日本」(1931~1941)與「既有強權美國 vs. 崛起強權中國」(1993~2018)的比較，能為現今的美中關係提供許多建設性的思考。本文從既有強權的角度觀察其如何回應崛起強權;以Randall Schweller的歸納為基礎而建立一個相對完整的政策選擇全貌。作者發現:面對1931~1941年崛起的日本，美國先採「中立、綏靖」，後改採「制衡」，最終採「戰爭」。面對1993~2018年崛起的中國，美國以「交往」為基..

This paper argues that the comparative study of the two cases - the US dominant power vs. the Japan rising power (1931-1941) and the US dominant power vs. the China rising power (1993-2018) can provide ample constructive thinking on the contemporary US-China relations. This paper focuses on how a dominant power reacts to a rising power. An analytical framework of dominant powers’ policy options toward rising powers, based on Randall Schweller’s theories, is developed and applied to this study. This paper has found..

本研究目的在於，從中國與北韓的國家利益角度，分析金正恩時期中朝之間合作與衝突的背景，進而探討雙方關係的走向。自習近平與金正恩於 2013 年分別出任中國與北韓的國家元首以來，由於中朝兩國皆採取對對方國家利益有所損失的政策，使雙方關係陷入緊張。就北韓的國家利益而言，穩定以金正恩為首的共產黨政權為第一要務。因此，金正恩上台之後，繼承金正日的「先軍政治」，持續研發軍事科技，進行試射導彈、第 3 次核試爆，採取「經濟、核武建設並進路線」，以凝聚國內團結，且處決危及金..

The purpose of this project is to analyze the historical background of co- operation and conflict between China and North Korea during the Kim Jung- un era from both Chinese and North Korean’s national-interest perspective, as well as the direction of bilateral relationships. Since Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un took office as China and North Korea’s head of state in 2013 respectively, both countries have been adopting policies to lose their people’s national interest from each other, which in turn have caused g..

2016 年 1 月 6 日北韓進行第四次核試爆至 2017 年 9 月 3 日進行第六次核試爆，是北韓史上最密集發展核武及遠端投射能力的時期，這使美朝關係因此陷入年金正恩掌權以來最危險的時刻，雙方開戰傳言不斷。本文回顧這段期間的美朝戰略互動，發現雙方關係較貼近「螺旋模式」而非「嚇阻理論」假設。據此，若美朝對彼此「認知(perception)」無法調整，則雙方將因自我的不安全感無法解除，使對峙局面持續。而美朝關係能否走向緩解，關鍵不在美朝..

From January 6, 2016 to September 3, 2017, North Korea has executed three times of nuclear weapon testing, marking the highest frequency of testing in its history. As a result, this tension later built up the worst time of U.S.-North Korea relations after Kim Jong-un ruled the country. Because of this tension, there are a large number of reports that predict the U.S. will fight North Korea at any time. This research reviews the strategic interactions between U.S. and North Korea during that period, and then argues that the si..

本文檢視 9 個在 2000 年至 2013 年與中華民國(以下簡稱臺灣)斷交的國家，以探討友邦與我斷交背後的中華人民共和國(以下稱中國)因素。本研究發現，對臺灣友邦來說，獲取來自中國在貿易、投資與金援的經濟考量，以及透過中國的支持提升其國際地位與穩固國內政權的政治考量，是影響友邦是否願意與臺灣延續外交關係的重要因素。大部分友邦在與臺灣斷交後，均能獲取大量來自中國的經濟與政治利益，即便是擁有長期穩固邦誼的友邦亦然。從友邦的角度來看，透過遊走於兩岸的外交競爭之..

This paper investigates the underlying China factor that played out when nine countries ended diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (hereafter called ‘Taiwan’). Research shows acquiring economic benefits from China, in terms of trade, investment and foreign aid, securing China’s support for enhancing international status and consolidating domestic political power are important factors when an ally of Taiwan considers breaking ties. Most allies receive immediate and significant political and economi..

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上，美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜，混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件，美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述，單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議，以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例，試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例，美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..