本文基於一國憲政體制類型會影響政府在COVID-19疫情時運作的方式，嘗試探討台灣半總統制政府如何回應疫情。研究焦點放在中央政府層次，探討總統、行政院院長、疫情指揮中心（指揮官）以及國會等部門的運作，並考量一致性政府和總統兼黨主席等因素的影響。研究發現，在總統權力優勢的半總統制下，蔡英文總統在處理疫情上的角色是多重的，藉由總統和黨主席雙重身份，她既是主要政策決定者，也同時介入政策執行的督導和措施的指示。相對而言，行政院院長暨其領導的相關部會仍是因應疫情的行政主體，不過因疫情指揮中心和指揮..

Based on the fact that the type of government system will affect the way the government operates during the COVID-19 epidemic, this article attempts to explore how Taiwan’s semi-presidential government handled the epidemic. The focus of the study is on the central government level, exploring the operations of the president, the president of the Executive Yuan, the epidemic command center (commander), and Congress, and considering the impact of factors such as unified government and the fact that the president is the chairman of a poli..

本文探討半總統制下的立法課責，以臺灣與法國為個案進行比較研究。「立法課責」指如何讓立法者(集體或個別)的所作所為能為利害關係人知道，而據以獎懲。過去比較臺、法的研究發現，總理總統制的法國，國會的運作型態較偏內閣制;總統議會制的臺灣，運作則較偏總統制，因而在傳統印象上，多會認為法國會較重視以政黨為對象的集體課責，臺灣則可能較偏重以候選人或立委為對象的個別課責。   本文乃透過制度規範上對選舉前與選舉後的資訊公開要求，比較臺灣與法國在集體課責與個別課..

This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s p..

半總統制是新興民主國家廣為採用的政府制度類型，而現有關於半總統制的研究不論是著重憲法規範或實證行為面向，對於總統常態性的政策權限設計和相關的決策機關配置的系統性探討較為欠缺。本文試圖藉由包括臺灣在內共 21 個半總統制民主國家憲法設計的探索，讓半總統制的研究和理論能觸及總統常態性的治理課題，是半總統制研究中的新嘗試。本文焦點在於系統性解析多個國家憲法中總統的政策權與決策機關之設計模式，並進一步探討其與半總統制憲法上的次類型和實際的運作類型之關係。藉由多國案例..

Semi-presidentialism has been a popular form of government in emerging democracies. However, systematic analyses on the presidents’ powers in policy-making or on the related mechanisms of their decision- making process have been scarce. To fill in the gap in the field, this article surveys the experiences of 21 democratic countries. With a focus on constitutional design of president’s powers in policy and decision-making mechanisms, this article also tries to discover their relationship with sub- types of semi-pre..

本文的目的在於探討蜜月期選舉時程如何在半總統制下，對前三大政黨在國會選舉時的表現，產生不同於在總統制下所產生的影響。本文認為，由於總統制與半總統制的權力分立程度不同，所以導引出來的蜜月期選舉效應也就相異。根據既有文獻可知，在總統制下，因為權力完全分立，總統黨與第三黨在以具有比例性的選制所進行的蜜月期國會大選中會選得比較好，但本文認為這個效應無法類推到半總統制國家。在半總統制下，因為權力只有部分分立，國會大選是行政權選舉的第二階段，所以即便在蜜月期選舉時程中，..

This paper aims at exploring how semi-presidentialism differs from presidentialism in affecting electoral performance of three largest parties in honeymoon elections. This paper argues that different levels of power separation in presidentialism and semi-presidentialism explain why the effects of honeymoon elections vary. Many existent studies indicated that in presidential systems, with total power separation, the largest and the third largest parties would gain in honeymoon elections that used proportional electoral systems..

半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..