受到中央集權歷史傳統之影響，法國地方建制乃是以「鞏固行政權」或 「代行行政權」為特色;即使歷經了兩波「去中央集權化」，法國的行政權優勢性依然扮演重要角色，且造成中央集權與「地方分權」並進之現象。在進入第五共和時期後，「強行政、弱立法」的制度特徵，以及隨著修憲而逐步建立的「體制大總統化」，更確認了法國總統在行政權運作當中的核心定位，並使「優勢行政權」成為論述法國政治發展的重點。 從憲政研究的角度來看，論者經常是以「總統化」闡述法國憲政運作..

This paper reinvestigates dominant executive power in France. Due to France’s historical background as a highly centralized state, local governments play a role in “consolidating” or “acting for” executive power. Even though France has encountered two waves of reforms of decentralization, executive power is still more dominant than legislative power, a characteristic of the Fifth Republic. Nevertheless, amendments to the constitution have placed the President at the center of the operations of ex..

半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..

法國與臺灣的政府體制都屬於半總統制，法國的憲政經驗中曾出現過三次的「左右共治」，臺灣的憲政經驗中卻從未出現過「藍綠共治」，何以如此?這是本文欲探討的課題。本文藉助賽局理論作為分析工具，探討制度安排如何影響行動者間的策略互動，以致最後產生了共治與否的差異。法國與臺灣擁有不同的選舉制度和不同的國會保障機制，在兩種制度因素的交互作用下，會引導分屬不同政黨陣營的總統和國會多數產生不同的政治計算與策略互動，最終導致法國出現「左右共治」，臺灣卻沒有出現「藍綠共治」。 ..

Both France and Taiwan’s political systems are semi-presidential. However, “cohabitation” in French constitutional experience has occurred three times while Taiwan has never seen “cohabitation” until now. Finding the reason for this difference is the central question of this paper. By using the game theory as an analysis tool, the paper explores how the institutional design influences the actors’ strategic interactions, which underlies the discrepancy between France and Taiwan in “coh..