2005年，印度與中國建立了「戰略合作夥伴關係」(strategic cooperative partnership)，給予外界中印關係改善的印象。在現實情況中，中印的戰略夥伴關係呈現出在安全與經濟上的落差，較類似兩個原本敵意深重的發展中國家，為了經濟發展所進行的策略聯盟，以經濟發展為重，而與安全合作及解決主權與邊界爭議較無關。本文從決策者進行合作時的利益與成本考量的角度，探討中印「戰略夥伴關係」的發展前景。中印建構戰略夥伴關係，是決..

In 2005, China and India established a “strategic cooperative partnership,” which led to rising optimism about China-India relations. This article discusses prospects of the China-India strategic partnership from the perspective of benefit and cost. The China-India strategic partnership is regarded as an attempt by the leaders of the two countries to change bilateral relations from non-cooperation to cooperation. The key to successful transformation lies in the fact that decision makers of both sides can recognize..

本文利用追蹤資料向量自我迴歸模型，檢證 2003~2012 年中美外援非洲的動機與成效。結果顯示，大國外援有相同之處:兩者外援目的，都不是基於國際道義考量，但大國外援也存在差異的地方:中國外援以現實利益為主，目的為確保其企業海外投資安全。美國外援則不局限在經濟利益而已，更加側重非傳統安全領域;換言之，美援強調的是綜合利益。中美兩國外援模式差異，肇因於彼此政府對自身所處國際體系地位的認知不同。  

In this paper, we used the panel data vector autoregression model (PVAR) to test motivation and effectiveness of the U.S. and China’s foreign aid (FA) in Africa. Empirical results show similarities in the great power’s foreign aid: the purpose of both great power’s FA is not based on international moral considerations. However there are also major differences between these two great power’s FA. Chinese FA is based on real interests and mainly aims to ensure safety of its outward foreign dire..

Benjamin J. Cohen 和 Eric. Helleiner 對貨幣權力進行概念論述，但欠缺具體操作指標，學者趙文志依 Cohen 貨幣權力理論中的延遲權力與轉移權力，提出延遲權力中有中、美兩國外匯儲備量、國債發行規模的借貸能力，轉移權力以貿易占 GDP 比值的開放程度，共三項具體指標，指出美國開放度比中國低、但美元流動性與借貸能力高於中國，說明美國對中國有貨幣權力，但該文無法說明中國外匯存底和貿易開放程度都高於美國，但為何是美國擁有貨幣權力，顯然..

Although Benjamin J. Cohen and Eric Helleiner have developed narratives on Monetary Power, there is no clear operational definition of the term. Based on Cohen’s discussion of the power of delay and the power of transfer, Chou Wen-Chi came up with three criteria to measure Monetary Power: foreign reserve, outstanding national debt, and percentage of trade in GDP. Using these criteria, he pointed out that although the US is less trade- dependent, liquidity of US Dollar and borrowing ability of the US are both higher. Thu..

2013 年 1 月 22 日，菲律賓依據聯合國海洋法公約第 15 部分第 287 條與 附件 7 之規定，片面對中國啟動關於南海海洋管轄權爭端的強制仲裁程序。 在中國聲明拒絕接受及參與此一程序的情況下，仲裁庭在 2015 年 10 月 29 日宣判對本案之管轄權成立，並於同年 11 月完成實質問題階段的開庭審理，預定 2016 年 6 月以前作出判決。菲律賓有計畫地設計對中國九段線及歷史性權利主張的法律戰，試圖瓦解中國的南海主張，對該主張的合法性帶來極大的..

On January 22 2013, Philippines unilaterally initiated compulsory arbitral procedure against China, in accordance with Part XV, Article 287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ), concerning matters relating to their disputes over maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea. China formally declared its objection against the procedure and refused to participate. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the Arbitral Tribunal established its jurisdiction on October 29 2015, and conducted hearings on merits ..

北京倡議的「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」(簡稱:亞投行)，在華府眼中，卻認為會挑戰到當今美國主導的全球經濟秩序。事實上，資本額度僅 1000 億美元的亞投行，無法撼動美國在全球金融政治中的主導地位。美國對亞投行戒慎恐懼，真是美元的地位受到威脅?亞投行的設立是否真能實踐人民幣國際化的目標?本文主張，中國應支持亞投行以美元發行(而非人民幣計價) 的「亞投行債券」，並同時設立「帶路基金」發行人民幣計價的「帶路基金債券」。如此，中國才得逐步降低對美國國債的過度依賴，掌握到..

Beijing launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB)in order to offer financial resources for more investments to Asian countries in need. To some extent, the US$ 100 billion AIIB is not supposed to impose any serious threat to U.S. dominance in global finance. Why does the U.S. fear the China-led AIIB? Would the establishment of AIIB speed up decline of the dollar as an international currency? Is the AIIB likely to contribute to further internationalization of the renminbi(RMB)? This paper contends that China shou..