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搜尋結果 : 和"法國"有關的資料, 共有86筆
法國的印太戰略:兼論對歐盟及臺灣的影響
France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Impact on the European Union and Taiwan
陳月卿 (Yueh-ching Chen)
63卷4期(2024/12/01)

本文探討法國印太戰略對歐盟與臺灣影響,認為法國的印太戰略在美 國與中國競逐的壓力下,採取了積極的策略,並影響歐盟印太合作戰略的 方向。法國的印太戰略以捍衛國家安全為核心,採取積極避險策略,一方 面希望提升法國在歐盟內部的影響力,另一方面則希望促進歐盟與印太國 家的經貿合作,幫助歐洲擺脫美國在烏克蘭危機上對歐洲的控制和主導。 法國的積極作為促使歐盟印太合作戰略增強與印太地區國家發展多邊關 係,並有助於將臺灣納入歐盟印太地區整體的安全與經濟合作框架中。

This article explores the impact of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy on the European Union and Taiwan. It argues that, under the pressure of competition between the United States and China, France has adopted a proactive strategy that influences the direction of the EU’s Indo-Pacific cooperation strategy. Centered on safeguarding national security, France takes an active hedging strategy on the Indo-Pacific region. On one hand, France seeks to enhance its influence within the EU; on the other hand, it aims to promote economic and ..

半總統制下的立法課責:臺灣與法國國會制度面的比較研究
Legislative Accountability under Semi- presidentialism: An Institutional Comparison between Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and French National Assembly
陳月卿 (Yueh-ching Chen) 廖達琪 (Da-chi Liao)
60卷1期(2021/03/01)

本文探討半總統制下的立法課責,以臺灣與法國為個案進行比較研究。「立法課責」指如何讓立法者(集體或個別)的所作所為能為利害關係人知道,而據以獎懲。過去比較臺、法的研究發現,總理總統制的法國,國會的運作型態較偏內閣制;總統議會制的臺灣,運作則較偏總統制,因而在傳統印象上,多會認為法國會較重視以政黨為對象的集體課責,臺灣則可能較偏重以候選人或立委為對象的個別課責。   本文乃透過制度規範上對選舉前與選舉後的資訊公開要求,比較臺灣與法國在集體課責與個別課..

This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s p..

半總統制下的國會監督-從法制面比較台灣與法國國會的監督能量
Parliamentary Oversight Capacity under A Semi-Presidential System-An Institutional Comparison between Taiwan's Legislative Yuan and theFrench National Assembly
廖達琪(Da-Chi Liao)陳月卿(Yueh-Ching Chen)李承訓(Cheng-Hsun Li)
52卷2期(2013/06/01)

半總統制的設計,通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下,由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施,國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量,則在文獻上甚少探討,也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國,並從較傳統的制度面切入,來探究兩國在制度設計安排上,賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排,主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..

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