This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s presidential-parliamentary is most similar to a presidential one. Therefore, under the traditional impression, France will pay more attention to the collective accountability on political parties, while Taiwan may prefer the individual accountability on legislators.

 

This article then compares the information transparency requirements before and after an election in order to find the differences between Taiwan and France. Before an election, at the aggregative level, the authors make a comparison between the parliamentary electoral system and political party management; at the individual level, the authors compare the information transparency for candidates. After an election, the comparative objects are the whole parliament and legislators at the aggregative and individual levels, respectively.

 

This paper has three findings: first, the legislative accountability under a single-member district is more inclined to individual accountability and legislators were supposed to be more responsive to their constituency principal(s). However, the two-round voting system is more inclined to collective accountability, since political parties usually take a joint campaign strategy, the collective accountability then will be more valued. Consequently, France valued collective accountability more than Taiwan. Second, in the extent of information transparency before an election, France asks political parties and candidates to provide more information than Taiwan; thus, both the collective and individual accountability, France is better than Taiwan. Third, as for the information transparency requirements after an election, French regulations are stricter than Taiwan’s both at the aggregative and individual levels. Therefore, in both collective and individual accountabilities, France is better than Taiwan.

 

In conclusion, French regulations of information transparency are more stringent than Taiwan in both collective and individual accountability on political parties and legislators, no matter before or after an election. Therefore, the French style may be a reference for Taiwan to promote parliamentary reform or regulatory revisions.