北京倡議的「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」(簡稱:亞投行)，在華府眼中，卻認為會挑戰到當今美國主導的全球經濟秩序。事實上，資本額度僅 1000 億美元的亞投行，無法撼動美國在全球金融政治中的主導地位。美國對亞投行戒慎恐懼，真是美元的地位受到威脅?亞投行的設立是否真能實踐人民幣國際化的目標?本文主張，中國應支持亞投行以美元發行(而非人民幣計價) 的「亞投行債券」，並同時設立「帶路基金」發行人民幣計價的「帶路基金債券」。如此，中國才得逐步降低對美國國債的過度依賴，掌握到..

Beijing launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB)in order to offer financial resources for more investments to Asian countries in need. To some extent, the US$ 100 billion AIIB is not supposed to impose any serious threat to U.S. dominance in global finance. Why does the U.S. fear the China-led AIIB? Would the establishment of AIIB speed up decline of the dollar as an international currency? Is the AIIB likely to contribute to further internationalization of the renminbi(RMB)? This paper contends that China shou..

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上，美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜，混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件，美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述，單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議，以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例，試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例，美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..