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中東歐半總統制國家聯合內閣的組成和運作
Formation and Operation of Coalition Cabinets in Semi-Presidential Countries in Central and Eastern Europe
蔡榮祥 (Jung-Hsiang Tsai)
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65卷3期(2026/09/08)
半總統制的聯合內閣如何形成？半總統制下的總統如何影響內閣的組
成和運作？聯合內閣不同的運作模式如何影響聯合內閣的存續？是本文主
要的研究問題。本文的結論如下：第一、中東歐多數的半總統制國家之總
統是屬於無黨籍總統，憲法規定當選之後必須退出政黨運作。然而這些無
黨籍總統並沒有退居二線或是扮演超然中立的角色，依然會運作其憲法上
的權威主導或是介入內閣的運作。特別是當國會沒有任何一個政黨控制過
半數時，總統可以主導選擇結盟的政黨對象，藉由組合多數來籌組多黨內
閣。第二、半總統制下多黨內閣的組合基礎會影響內閣的存活時間。當聯
盟政黨之間屬於便利聯盟的情況下較容易瓦解。當聯盟政黨之間是以意識
形態的立場合作時，其存活期間相對較長。第三、半總統制的總統和總理
的權力平衡關係在多黨內閣的情況下，較容易向總統方向傾斜，因為總理
的政黨並沒有掌握國會的過半數且總統有較高的民主正當性，當多黨內閣
的總理如果無法鞏固聯盟黨的支持，其內閣很容易失去多數，甚至最後被
反對多數解職下台。
The main research questions addressed in this paper are: How does a
coalition cabinet form in a semi-presidential system, in what ways does the
president influence its formation and operation, and how do different modes of
coalition governance affect cabinet durability? The conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, in many semi-presidential countries in Eastern Europe, the president is a
non-partisan f igure constitutionally required to withdraw from partisan politics
after election. However, these non-partisan presidents do not remain sidelined
or play a neutral role; they continue to exercise their constitutional authority
to lead or intervene in cabinet operations. Particularly when no single party
commands a parliamentary majority, the president can take the lead in selecting
coalition partners to form a multi-party cabinet. Secondly, the foundation upon
which coalition governments are built in semi-presidential systems significantly
influences their longevity. Coalitions formed merely for convenience among
parties are more prone to collapse, whereas those formed in the basis of
ideological alignment tend to endure longer. Thirdly, in semi-presidential
systems, the power balance between the president and the prime minister often
leans towards the president in multi-party cabinets. This is because the prime
minister’s party lacks a parliamentary majority, while the president enjoys
greater democratic legitimacy. If the prime minister fails to consolidate support within the coalition parties, the cabinet risks losing its majority and may
ultimately face dismissal by an opposing parliamentary majority.
半總統制 聯合內閣 總統影響力 政治穩定 多黨內閣 Semi-Presidentialism Coalition Cabinets Presidential Influence Political Durability Multi-party Cabinet

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