問題與研究

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陳欣之 (Hsin-Chih Chen)

即將出版

65卷1期(2026/03/31)

霸權擁有生產高附加價值與高科技商品的獨佔地位，加之次等國單方依賴霸權商品，塑成霸權使用非暴力的經濟脅迫（economic coercion）措施，施壓目標國，以達到「不戰而屈人之兵」的戰略、政治與經貿目標。鴉片戰爭前，清帝國多次採取「封關」等貿易脅迫措施，禁絕茶葉出口，迫使英國等互市外夷屈服讓步，強化清帝國的經濟脅迫習慣（habit）。國際關係與外交決策的觀點，多批判清政府決策菁英的自大無知，或是強調滿清政權的朝貢制度天朝思維，而少有省思，清政府採取「封關」脅迫措施的決策過程，以及造成清帝國經濟脅迫措施失敗的根源。

本文從習慣的視角，勾勒霸權塑成經濟脅迫習慣的初始條件（initial conditions），關鍵時刻（critical juncture）與自我強化（selfreinforcement）歷程，溯源清帝國「以茶制夷」的經濟脅迫慣性實踐，鋪陳滿清霸權對外採取經濟脅迫策略的習慣執念，揭露清廷經濟脅迫習慣在處理鴉片封禁決策過程中所扮演的角色。本文發現，過往的成功經驗，強化清帝國以為經濟脅迫是懾服外夷的習慣決策執念。鴉片戰爭爆發前，北京中樞沒有察覺經濟脅迫策略的成功要件已然消失，面對不惜以武力改變霸權秩序的改變現狀國家（revisionist states），霸權的決策習慣，窄化霸權的決策視野，約制霸權的回應策略選項，使已經褪色的霸權軍事優勢，益發無力拒阻改變現狀國家的挑戰。本文對於霸權經濟脅迫習慣的發現，將對評估美國川普政府經貿脅迫策略之發展，提供理論性的分析貢獻。

Hegemons possess a monopolistic position in producing high-value-addedand high-tech goods, coupled with the unilateral dependence of subordinate states on these products. This dynamic enables hegemons to employ non-violent economic coercion to pressure target states, achieving strategic, political, andeconomic objectives aligned with the principle of “winning without fighting”.

Before the Opium War, the Qing Empire frequently adopted trade coercion measures, such as “closing borders”, to ban tea exports and force concessions from trading partners like Britain. These actions reinforced the Qing Empire’s habit of economic coercion. From the perspectives of international relations and diplomatic decision-making, critiques often focus on the arrogance and ignorance of Qing decision-makers or emphasize the Sinocentric tributary mindset of the Qing regime. However, little attention has been given to the decision-making process behind the Qing government’s coercive trade measures and the roots of their failure.

This study adopts a habitual perspective to outline the initial conditions, critical junctures, and self-reinforcing processes through which hegemonic habits of economic coercion are shaped. It traces the Qing Empire’s habitual practices of economic coercion, particularly its strategy of “using tea to control

foreign powers”. The paper highlights the Qing Empire’s persistent reliance on economic coercion in foreign policy and reveals the role these habitual practices played in its decision-making during the prohibition of the opium trade.

The findings suggest that past successes reinforced the Qing Empire’s habitual reliance on economic coercion as a default strategy for subduing foreign states. On the eve of the Opium War, Beijing’s leadership failed to recognize that the conditions for successful economic coercion had eroded. When confronted with revisionist states willing to use military force to shift the hegemonic order, the Qing’s habitual decision-making narrowed its strategic vision and constrained its policy responses. Consequently, the declining hegemonic military advantage became increasingly ineffective in resisting challenges from revisionist states.

The study’s insights into the habitual nature of hegemonic economic coercion contribute to the theoretical analysis of the development of the Trump administration’s economic coercion strategies.

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