2010年中國漁船與日本海上保安廳巡邏船於釣魚臺相撞之後，中國向日本禁運稀土，此例成為經濟脅迫的一個顯著案例。2019年左右中國官方媒體又再次將稀土視為與美國貿易戰的武器，此使中國的稀土政策、稀土供應鏈的韌性重新成為人們關注的焦點。為了確定稀土用於經濟制裁或經濟脅迫時的有效性，我們有必要重新審視中國2010年對日本進行稀土禁運案例。本文重新審視了當時日本政府對於中國對日禁運稀土所採取的一連串政策回應，並檢視2010年後日本與稀土相關的經濟安全政策。此外，基於此案例，本文發展出評估單一國家經濟脅迫有效性的分析架構。本文研究發現由於日本針對中國禁運稀土及出口限制採取多重反制措施，這些措施使得中國抬高稀土價格的嘗試並未成功，甚至導致部分產業發明少用或免用稀土的產品，可能反使其市場價值下跌。長遠來看，由於此案例引起了美國和日本的擔憂，促進兩國合作推動強化關鍵礦產供應鏈韌性，以減少對中國稀土出口的依存。現存的經濟制裁理論評估有效性時，往往重視政治目標是否達成，因此日本政府釋放中國漁船船長被認為是中國的政治勝利，但本文主張應同時評估該經濟脅迫的長期負面效應及跨國集體行動的可能性。

China’s media has reported multiple times that the country could use its rare earth exports as a countermeasure against the United States since the Trump administration launched its trade war. President Biden has sought international cooperation to bolster supply chains and counter China’s economic coercion, and rare earth elements have been identified as the key resources in this campaign. To determine whether rare earth elements can be used effectively in economic sanctions, we must re-examine China’s 2010 embargo on rare earths to Japan, a highly relevant case of economic coercion. This paper revisits the embargo and Tokyo’s responses, arguing that a broader framework should be used to determine whether economic coercion is effective. While the release of the skipper of the Chinese fishing vessel was considered a political victory in China, the country’s attempt to raise the price of rare earth was unsuccessful in the long run and caused a decline in its market value. This was due to the multiple countermeasures that Japan employed against export restrictions. Moreover, Beijing’s coercive use of rare earth raised concerns among the United States and Japan that inspired collective action as the two nations worked to fortify critical mineral supply chains.