韓國財閥如現代、三星、LG，目前已是全球知名企業。他們的崛起與韓國政府的強烈支持有重大關係：政府支持財閥，分擔其投資分險、給予寡、獨占市場控制;財閥則回報政府以提供就業機會、賺取外匯、促進經濟成長。然而在此光明表象下，韓國政府與財閥間也有為人詬病的陰暗關係：政府官員收受財閥政治獻金及其他種種 「政治規費」，財閥則被回報以財經措施上的優惠。而隨著政治民主化，政府遭受國民逐漸上升的監督，要求政府和財閥的透明關係，並控制富可敵國的財閥。然而財閥則因經濟自由化而日益壯大，不再受制於政府的管控。韓..

Korean conglomerates, or chaebols in Korean, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, are now familiar and global enterprises. However, the rising of chaebols was supported and often pushed by Korean government. For instance, government and chaebols shared investment risks and their aims to keep national market oligarchic or monopolistic, etc. Chaebols returned by creating employment opportunities， earning foreign exchanges, and driving economic development. But underneath the shining surface lies a dark and notorious side: for economic, financial, an..

本文主要在探討泰國金融改革過程中，國內主要行為者之間的制度性關係。受到 1997 年金融風暴的影響，民主黨(Democrat Party)的乃川 (Chuan Leekpai)政府接受國際貨幣基金(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的建議與援助，從國家長期發展的角度出發，採取了相關的結構性改革政策。但是，2001 年上台的塔克辛(Thaksin Shinawatra)政府卻採取凱恩斯主義為主的民粹政策，希望可以在短期內達到金融..

This paper explores the domestic institutional arrangements and relationships among key political and financial actors in the process of Thailand’s financial reform. Affected by the Asian 1997 financial crisis, the Chuan government adopted structural reform policies which were suggested by the IMF as a long-term solution. However, the Thaksin government which took office in 2001 adopted Keynesian and populist policies to stimulate economic growth and financial stability which focused on short term results. Whose policie..