日本首相握有解散眾議院的權力，眾議院解散後必然伴隨著眾議院的改選，而眾議院的多數勢力得以組閣執政，掌握國家龐大的政治資源。取得政權是政黨的最優先戰略目標，因此首相會選擇有利的時機解散眾議院。 以往的研究指出，首相解散眾議院通常有先決條與最佳時機。但是，安倍首相於 2014 年 11 月宣布解散眾議院的狀況，不同以往，甚至安倍首相自身提出的以暫緩提升消費稅為解散的理由，對選民而言亦欠缺說服力。既然如此，安倍首相為何還是宣布解散眾議院?本文..

The Japanese prime minister is empowered to dissolve the House of Representatives, which sets a stage for a general election that enables the parliamentary majority to form a new cabinet. The prime minister will choose a favorable opportunity to dissolve the House of Representatives in order to retain the regime. Previous studies have indicated that there are certain conditions and optimal timing for the prime minister to disband the House of Representatives. However, the dissolution announced by Prime Minister Abe..

本文主要是補充論述日本新選舉制度與自民黨走向集權化的關係。既有研究指出，在新選舉制度下，日本自民黨的派閥勢力逐漸地瓦解，從政治過程的觀察中，同時顯示出自民黨派閥的影響力確實也在消退中。本文發現，自民黨在新選舉制度下，依然維持「現任者優先」的提名策略，而「現任者優先」卻具有默認既存派閥勢力的意味。就此而言，派閥勢力應該保有足夠的生存空間，又為何會在新選舉制度下逐漸消退呢 ? 本文擬從候選人在新選舉制度下的「趨中現象」、「政權公約」的黨中央主導、重複提名的設計與比例的提高，以及 「七十三歲屆..

The main purpose of this paper is to further elaborate on the relationship between Japan's new electoral system and augmentation of power in the LDP central committee. The existing studies pointed out that the newly-reformed electoral system in Japan leads to a gradual decline of factions within the LDP while the actual power of the LDP central committee was elevated. However, this paper argues that if LDP's nomination process in the new electoral system still complies with the principle of “incumbents first," which w..