半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..