北京倡議的「亞洲基礎設施投資銀行」(簡稱:亞投行)，在華府眼中，卻認為會挑戰到當今美國主導的全球經濟秩序。事實上，資本額度僅 1000 億美元的亞投行，無法撼動美國在全球金融政治中的主導地位。美國對亞投行戒慎恐懼，真是美元的地位受到威脅?亞投行的設立是否真能實踐人民幣國際化的目標?本文主張，中國應支持亞投行以美元發行(而非人民幣計價) 的「亞投行債券」，並同時設立「帶路基金」發行人民幣計價的「帶路基金債券」。如此，中國才得逐步降低對美國國債的過度依賴，掌握到..

Beijing launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB)in order to offer financial resources for more investments to Asian countries in need. To some extent, the US$ 100 billion AIIB is not supposed to impose any serious threat to U.S. dominance in global finance. Why does the U.S. fear the China-led AIIB? Would the establishment of AIIB speed up decline of the dollar as an international currency? Is the AIIB likely to contribute to further internationalization of the renminbi(RMB)? This paper contends that China shou..

兩岸關係基本結構「政治疏離、經濟融合」，素有「經濟能否扭轉政治」之辯論。過去研究多直接討論經濟交流下的政治效果，卻較少對於經濟 「如何」影響政治多加描繪，使政治效果產出之前經濟發揮之「潛移默化過程」未能清楚交代。為能釐清經濟如何發揮政治影響力，本文以兩岸經貿交流現況中，大陸著力甚深的「台灣農漁產品採購」政策，聚焦兩岸首次漁業契作:「學甲—上海虱目魚契作」，討論經濟影響政治的機制及其作用。根據本文研究，中共對台農漁採購政策效果並不在於立即性的扭轉台..

Since the two sides of the Taiwan Strait restarted economic negotiations and signed a number of socio-economic agreements, there has been growing interests in the political implications of the economic linkage. While previous studies mostly illustrated various political outcomes of Cross-Strait economic exchanges, they tended to overlook how China can utilize its economic leverage to influence Taiwan. This paper argues that China’s preferential policies toward Taiwan farmers did not aim to alter Taiwanese identity in th..

近廿年來中俄關係已從友好的、建設性的成為戰略性的夥伴關係，進入中俄前所未有之友好高峰期。實際上，中俄戰略協作夥伴關係是中俄的權力分布共識與利益匯集於因應美國霸權的威脅，由於美國對外戰略牽動中、俄關係的發展，中俄雙邊互動也影響著大國權力平衡關係。中俄戰略協作夥伴關係的本質除了有關平衡美國霸權外，既有的雙邊共識與追求利益張力似正影響著雙邊關係的發展。隨著美國單極的鬆動與中國的崛起，中俄關係逐漸偏離傳統權力平衡的意涵，轉為更為複雜的「制度性平衡」。因此，本文結合新..

In the last two decades, China-Russia relations have turned from “friendly” and “constructive,” to “strategic partnership” and reached an unprecedented peak. Indeed, the nature of the China-Russia strategic partnership is based on the consensus of power distribution in East Asia, while facing threats from the United States hegemony and bilateral economic interdependence. The diplomatic strategy of the United States not only affects the development and bilateral interaction of China-Russia r..

東協各國政府廣泛地認為，南海爭端是冷戰後東南亞主要的「衝突引爆點」。它也對東協的團結及其有關和平解決爭端的規範帶來了嚴峻的考驗。由於並非所有東協成員國都是南海島礁的聲索國，因此，東協對南海的共識與立場始終受到各國在南海不同利益的影響而罕有「一致性」，而東協決策的模式也顯示其南海政策立場的結構性問題。對南海衝突管理與海域劃界涉及的東協會員國至少有越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞與汶萊，印尼和新加坡的立場也值得關注。本文目的是探討作為一個整體的東協，如何回應南海緊張局勢的..

The South China Sea(SCS)dispute was widely viewed by ASEAN governments as the major ‘flashpoint of conflict’ in the post-Cold War Southeast Asia. It also posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and of its norms concerning peaceful settlements of disputes. Because not all ASEAN member countries are the claim countries of the SCS islands and reefs, therefore, the consensus and position of ASEAN on the SCS have always been rare "consistency" due to different interests in the SCS. ASEAN decision-making s..

本文旨在探討歐盟與中國如何實踐戰略夥伴關係的目標，以及分析在過程中所面臨的阻礙。本文從歐盟與中國如何認知自身國際地位開始，檢視雙方從夥伴關係走向戰略夥伴關係的期望，評估在實質上是否具有此等關係的基礎，以及雙方為何在解除對中國軍售禁令以及承認中國市場經濟地位此二議題上遲遲無法取得共識。本文認為歐盟和中國對於戰略夥伴關係的認知並不明確，在具體議題上缺乏實質合作，因而難以取得突破性的發展。現今歐盟與中國的交往已經進入「務實省思期」，雙方都必須思考如何在現有的框架對..

This article aims to examine the implementation of shaping the EU- China Strategic Partnership and investigate the obstacles they are encountering. Accordingly, the article will answer the following questions: (1)How do the EU and China define their strategic objectives?(2)What do they expect from the implementation of the strategic partnership?(3)Do they have fundamental consensus and benchmarks to shape this relationship? (4)Why does the EU reject to lift the arms embargo against China and refuse to recognise China’s ..