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搜尋結果 : 和"U.S."有關的資料, 共有349筆
擺盪「戰略自主」與「戰略機會」之間:探索後殖民認同下的印美關係發展
Between Strategic Autonomy and Strategic Concern: Exploring the India-U.S. Relationship in Post-Colonial Identity
李思嫺(Szu-hsien Lee)方天賜(Tien-sze Fang)
58卷3期(2019/09/01)

本文主軸在於檢視國家身分認同因素對印度外交政策長期與深層的影響,從新古典現實主義結合體系結構與單元層次的分析架構下,抽取出做為中介變數的身分認同因素是如何干擾印度對於體系壓力的回應,同時提供觀察印度政策選擇的另一種理論途徑。目的在於指出,欲理解印度外交政策具有的特質,必須輔以「後殖民身分認同」的干擾變數,而伴隨後殖民國家身分認同而來的戰略自主,則有助於解釋為何印度對美國總是存有不信任感,雙方戰略夥伴關係難以真正落實。未來印度視印美關係為一個戰略機會(現實主義..

The paper aims to examine the long-term and deep impact of national identity on India’s foreign policy. In order to address the objective and develop an alternative approach, the study is conducted using the Neo-Classical Realism theory, which combines analyses on systemic structure and states’ behavior at the unit-level, while emphasizing the factor of national identity on the formation of India’s foreign policy and its responses to systemic pressure. This paper argues that it is imperative to take account ..

既有強權對崛起強權的政策選擇分析:以美國對「日本崛起」與「中國崛起」之回應為例
An Analysis of Dominant Powers’ Policy Options toward Rising Powers: Examples of the U.S. Reactions to the Rise of Japan and China
陳亮智(Liang-chih Evans Chen)劉兆隆(Chao-lung Liu)
58卷1期(2019/03/01)

本文認為,「既有強權美國 vs. 崛起強權日本」(1931~1941)與「既有強權美國 vs. 崛起強權中國」(1993~2018)的比較,能為現今的美中關係提供許多建設性的思考。本文從既有強權的角度觀察其如何回應崛起強權;以Randall Schweller的歸納為基礎而建立一個相對完整的政策選擇全貌。作者發現:面對1931~1941年崛起的日本,美國先採「中立、綏靖」,後改採「制衡」,最終採「戰爭」。面對1993~2018年崛起的中國,美國以「交往」為基..

This paper argues that the comparative study of the two cases - the US dominant power vs. the Japan rising power (1931-1941) and the US dominant power vs. the China rising power (1993-2018) can provide ample constructive thinking on the contemporary US-China relations. This paper focuses on how a dominant power reacts to a rising power. An analytical framework of dominant powers’ policy options toward rising powers, based on Randall Schweller’s theories, is developed and applied to this study. This paper has found..

從「嚇阻理論」與「螺旋模式」檢視北韓第四次至第六次核試爆之間的美朝戰略互動
Analyzing the Strategic Interactions between U.S. and North Korea from the 4th to the 6th Nuclear Weapon Test by DPRK via Deterrence Theory and Spiral Model
馬準威(Chun-Wei Ma)
57卷4期(2018/12/01)

2016 年 1 月 6 日北韓進行第四次核試爆至 2017 年 9 月 3 日進行第六次核試爆,是北韓史上最密集發展核武及遠端投射能力的時期,這使美朝關係因此陷入年金正恩掌權以來最危險的時刻,雙方開戰傳言不斷。本文回顧這段期間的美朝戰略互動,發現雙方關係較貼近「螺旋模式」而非「嚇阻理論」假設。據此,若美朝對彼此「認知(perception)」無法調整,則雙方將因自我的不安全感無法解除,使對峙局面持續。而美朝關係能否走向緩解,關鍵不在美朝..

From January 6, 2016 to September 3, 2017, North Korea has executed three times of nuclear weapon testing, marking the highest frequency of testing in its history. As a result, this tension later built up the worst time of U.S.-North Korea relations after Kim Jong-un ruled the country. Because of this tension, there are a large number of reports that predict the U.S. will fight North Korea at any time. This research reviews the strategic interactions between U.S. and North Korea during that period, and then argues that the si..

「避險」視角下中國對美國的網路強國戰略研究
China’s Cyber Power Strategy vis-à-vis the U.S. using a ‘Hedging’ Perspective
張凱銘(Kai-Ming Chang)
57卷3期(2018/09/01)

過去多年間,中國在網路科技領域取得了突出的建設成果,成為當代國際網路事務要角。北京當局近期更提出「網路強國」戰略,試圖全面強化國家網路實力。中國在網路領域的進取,不僅對美國的固有優勢構成挑戰,也助長了美國政府對其戰略意圖的疑慮,從而增添雙邊關係的不穩定性。為瞭解中國網路建設藍圖與對美政策立場,本文審視了「網路強國」戰略的主要內容,及美國因素在其間的影響;同時透過國際關係研究中的「避險戰略」 探討中國對美網路互動態樣,說明中國政府如何在網路事務中,同步推動對美..

China has made huge advances in the field of cyber technology in the past few years and it is now an important player in international cyber affairs. Beijing recently introduced its ‘Cyber Power Strategy’ in a bid to comprehensively strengthen the nation’s cyber capabilities. China’s cyber ambitions not only constitute a real challenge to the U.S. but have also prompted concerns in Washington about China’s strategic purpose and have more uncertainty to their already unstable bilateral relations. ..

試探美國外交政策訊號之操作:以 2012~16 年美國在南海爭議和 APEC 承諾為例
Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy Signals: Evidence from 2012 - 2016 U.S. Involvement in South China Sea Disputes and APEC Commitments
黃偉峰(David W. F. Huang)
57卷3期(2018/09/01)

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上,美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜,混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件,美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述,單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議,以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例,試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例,美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..

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