近年來，隨著歐盟和北約組織的東擴與俄國的再度興起，位處西方民主國家與俄國之間「地緣斷層線」上的中東歐國家對俄國「抗衡或扈從」 的議題又再度浮上檯面。相關文獻指出，中、小國家與大國之間的利益相似程度，是決定其對該大國選擇「抗衡或扈從」關係的關鍵前提條件，據此，本文探討在這個「地緣斷層線」上16個曾具有相似背景的前「東方集團」的中東歐國家與俄國之間在外交政策利益相似程度上的變化。以近年來在各國所發生的事件為基礎，本文發現，經濟危機和民主退化的問題， 在近年來開始威脅著這些中東歐國家的傳統政黨..

Due to the eastern expansion of EU and NATO and the resurgence of Russia under Putin’s leadership, how the Central and Eastern European fault line states chose between balancing and bandwagoning toward Russia has become a salient issue in contemporary international relations studies. This article investigates changes in the degree of policy similarity between 16 former “Eastern Bloc” Central and Eastern European States and Russia. The rationale for this study is that previous studies demonstrated that this issue is the key..

本文主要研究問題是:中國大陸對於衝突預防的原則性立場與態度為何?在身為當事國與第三方行為者兩種不同身分時，其在實踐上有何不同?本文藉由南蘇丹危機與南海衝突兩個案例分析中國大陸在衝突預防實踐上，面對事關自身主權與國家利益以及與自身主權無關之衝突事件時，在衝突預防作為上有何差異?其宣示與實際作為有何落差?此外，為何中 國大陸在南海議題上，會由堅持雙邊對話，轉變為也同意透過多邊機制，作為處理南海主權爭議途徑的立場與作為?在這樣的雙邊與多邊機制下，呈現出怎樣的「中國..

The main research questions of the paper are as follow: first of all, what are China’s position, attitude, and actions in conflict prevention, second question is what is the difference between China’s action and statement on the issue of the South China Sea dispute and the South Sudan Crisis when China is one of the parties who faces sovereignty and national interest, and as a third- party in the practice of conflict prevention. Third question is why China is willing to change her position from insisting bilateral..

自我國與美國斷交後，過去40年來，美國政府對臺軍售始終為美國作為兩岸關係第三方影響的重要課題，亦為在兩岸間「衝突預防」的政策工具。美國對於臺灣的安全承諾，長期擺盪在安全利益與民主聲譽之間，亦根源於行政部門和國會之間的立場分野。有別於過去的分析途徑，本文從外交政策分析(FPA)的理論視角切入，以總統決策機制為分析單元，討論美國總統在對臺軍售決策機制中究竟扮演的關鍵角色，以總統任期、領導人安全觀及府會結構三項解釋變數，檢視歷屆美國總統對於公布軍售和..

Since the United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the U.S arms sales to Taiwan have been a critical issue affecting the Cross-Strait relations for the past 40 years. In order to preserve stability in the Taiwan Strait, maintaining sufficient self-defense capability for Taiwan has been the major goal of the United States. However, the U.S security commitment to Taiwan has long been fluctuating between security interests and democratic reputation. It also depends on the stance of the executive bran..

2016年8月1日原住民族日當天，蔡英文總統代表政府正式向原住民族道歉。自此之後，臺灣的原住民族政策便邁入了新頁。在眾多後續討論中，原住民族自治議題尤其受到族人與各界的關注。對此，現階段政府的規劃，是希望參酌美加紐等國經驗，透過「實質談判程序機制」來達到自治。此方案近似於前述原住民族先進國所採取的「條約模式」，也就是透過原住民族和國家(中央、地方政府)協商談判並簽訂協定的方式，來確認進而規範兩者間的關係。面對此一嶄新的方案，各界的討論卻相對有限。無獨有偶地，..

In 2016, President Ing-wen Tsai apologized to the Taiwanese indigenous peoples on behalf of the government, which is known as the National Apology. Echoing this National Apology, the Council of Indigenous Peoples reaffirmed its proposal called the “substantive negotiation process”. Before long, this innovative treaty-making provision opened a debate on whether or not such process can really fit in with Taiwan’s current constitutional and legal system. As a way to move forward, this article attempts to scruti..

國家間發生領土爭端時，常以展現或威脅使用軍事力量為主要威逼手段，若爭端國互不相讓，往往會陷入緊張的軍事對峙，隨時可能升級為全面武裝衝突。本文檢視此類不實際動武的軍事對峙，並提出兩個因素可有助緩和軍事對峙。首先，反覆僵持的爭端使雙方主動管理對峙行為，避免容易造成衝突升級的意外;再者，未定邊界或領土為雙方使用武力的緩衝地帶，針對爭議領土展示或威脅使用武力變成可理解的經常事件，對爭端國而言，爭議區域的武裝對峙或軍事行動不被視為立即的挑戰或威脅，衝突方傾向避免對峙惡..

States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territo..