本文回顧近年來政治經濟發展的研究。文中處理兩個主要的議題,第一個是國家在經濟發展中的角色,包括產業政策以及經濟自由化政策。產業政策部分討論贏家挑選政策、產業政策實踐上的差異、技術官僚與統治者之間的關係、影響發展途徑選擇的結構性因素,以及近年來發展型國家的轉型。其次,發展國家論的著重在工業政策,對經濟自由化政策常以經濟發展的另一種選項視之。本文討論國家如何交互使用這兩項政策,另外也分析影響經濟改革推動的制度與結構性因素。挑選贏家的過程中需將資源分配到最有潛力的部門,經濟自由化改革也需移除壟斷與保護,都面對政治壓力。因此,本文著重分析政府在推動經濟發展政策時所面臨的政治壓力,以及在哪些條件下可以克服這些反對。本文另一個主題則是回顧所得分配與社會安全的課題,討論影響東亞與台灣社會安全保障制度發展背後的政經因素,影響民眾所得重分配偏好的要素,以及所得分配對於民主體制支持與穩定的作用。
We review two important topics in the field of political and economic development. We discuss how states employ industrial policies and economic liberalization to promote economic development. Within the industrial policy framework, we delve into the issues of choosing winners, difference in industrial policy implementations, the relationship between technocracy and the rulers, structural factors that affect industrial policy choices, and the transformations of developmental states in recent years. Secondly, the debates surrounding developmental state center on industrial policies and mainly view economic liberalization policies as an alternative option. We shed light on how countries employ these two policies in an interactive manner and proceed to analyze the institutional and structural factors that affect the promotion of economic reforms. Selecting the potential winners and pushing through economic reforms both face political oppositions. Therefore, this article pays special attention to the political pressures confronted by governments when promoting these policies, as well as the conditions under which these oppositions can be effectively overcome. Finally, this paper offers an overview of income distribution and social security, with a specific focus on the factors influencing the development and evolution of the social safety net in Taiwan and East Asia. We also discuss when citizens prefer income redistribution and how income distribution is associated with popular support for democracy.
國家機關(the State)是否利用國家資源干預市場(the Market)、國家機關是否應選擇某些特定產業加以扶植(selective policy)?這些投入資源是否能被有效達成發展的目的?是政治經濟學界有關「新古典經濟學派」與 「發展型國家學派」爭辯的焦點。在東協國家中,同樣自 1970 年代發展汽車產業,為何泰國與馬來西亞的汽車產業發展出現差距?差距是否源自國家機關與產業政策互動的結果?本研究藉由探討馬來西亞與泰國汽車產業的發展歷程,試圖比較與論證..
Whether should the state interfere the market by using state resources? Should the state cultivate certain industries? Does the state resources work to help the state achieve developmental goals? These are the arguments between the ‘New Classical Economics School’ and the ‘National Development School’. Automobile industries in both Thailand and Malaysia developed in the 1970s with governmental interference but the development in the two countries diverged. Does the difference come from the interactions..
日本戰後形成的發展型國家體制被視為是1990 年代「失落十年」的元兇,日本政府因此採取了眾多政治與經濟上的構造改革。本文檢視日本發展型國家體制中兩個促成日本經濟成長的重要制度如何因改革而發生變化:一是力量強大的大藏省用來保護金融界的「護送船團」金融監理制度,二是傳統上金融界相互分擔分險、銀行和企業間特殊溝通管道而形成的「主要經辦銀行制度」。不少學者認為日本發展型國家已經轉型為英美式的監理型國家,但本文發現,雖然改革後的金融監理制度可說趨向監理型國家,「主要經..
The developmental state built after WWII has been blamed for Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990s. The Japanese government takes a lot of structure reforms in politics and economics. This article examines how the two- important traditional structures of Japanese developmental state that were named as the engines of postwar economic successes were transformed by reforms. The first is so called “convoy system” financial regulation: the powerful ministry Okurasho with this system protected the financi..
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