韓國財閥如現代、三星、LG，目前已是全球知名企業。他們的崛起與韓國政府的強烈支持有重大關係：政府支持財閥，分擔其投資分險、給予寡、獨占市場控制;財閥則回報政府以提供就業機會、賺取外匯、促進經濟成長。然而在此光明表象下，韓國政府與財閥間也有為人詬病的陰暗關係：政府官員收受財閥政治獻金及其他種種 「政治規費」，財閥則被回報以財經措施上的優惠。而隨著政治民主化，政府遭受國民逐漸上升的監督，要求政府和財閥的透明關係，並控制富可敵國的財閥。然而財閥則因經濟自由化而日益壯大，不再受制於政府的管控。韓國政府的財閥政策因此面臨兩難：壓制財閥恐提高財閥成本，不利經濟；放縱財閥則又招來國民批評。即使 1980 年代以來歷任總統都採取所謂的財閥政策，以及金融危機後的產業重組、防止經濟集中、財務改革與透明化、公司治理改革等四大面向的財閥政策 ，以降低韓國財閥的經濟集中度。但 本文分析結果認為，四大面向的改革並未達成目標，政府與財閥關係仍然相互依賴。不過，政府對財閥的公司治理改革，給予社會團體以小股東的身分監督財閥，或許可能在政府與財閥間設下一道防火牆。

Korean conglomerates, or chaebols in Korean, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, are now familiar and global enterprises. However, the rising of chaebols was supported and often pushed by Korean government. For instance, government and chaebols shared investment risks and their aims to keep national market oligarchic or monopolistic, etc. Chaebols returned by creating employment opportunities， earning foreign exchanges, and driving economic development. But underneath the shining surface lies a dark and notorious side: for economic, financial, and tax welfare, chaebols often bribed government officials with huge sum of illegal money, and officials sometimes also charged chaebols “political fees". As to Korean democratic development, government was asked to be more accountable to the people, and relations between government and chaebols also are to be more open and transparent, and to even restrain the huge and wealthy chaebols. However, chaebols through economic development and liberalization have become difficult to control, Korean government therefore faced a dilemma: either regulate chaebols with risk of economic downturn due to chaebols' cost-up or continue with laissez-faire with increasing discontent from people. After serial government's chaebol policy since the 1980s and post-financial crisis, political and economic reforms were focused on four aspects: industrial restructuring, prevention of wealth concentration, reforms of financial transparency, and corporate governance reforms for decreasing the economic power and concentration of chaebols. However, this article argues that the main goal of the chaebol policy was not attainted; the government-chaebol relations are still a form of mutual dependence and confrontation. Yet the rising of small shareholder's power in corporate governance reforms may empower social groups to build a firewall between government and chaebols.