半總統制是新興民主國家廣為採用的政府制度類型，而現有關於半總統制的研究不論是著重憲法規範或實證行為面向，對於總統常態性的政策權限設計和相關的決策機關配置的系統性探討較為欠缺。本文試圖藉由包括臺灣在內共 21 個半總統制民主國家憲法設計的探索，讓半總統制的研究和理論能觸及總統常態性的治理課題，是半總統制研究中的新嘗試。本文焦點在於系統性解析多個國家憲法中總統的政策權與決策機關之設計模式，並進一步探討其與半總統制憲法上的次類型和實際的運作類型之關係。藉由多國案例的分析，本文呈現了重要而豐富的研究發現。研究核心發現在於，當總統具有特定政策權限時，憲法也大都配置政策諮詢或決策機制，而總統是否具主持內閣會議(或部長會議)權限，並與半總統制之憲法類型和實務類型都有一定的關聯性，因此，從「誰主持內閣會議」這個問題切入，可以相當程度辨識出該國憲法設計之原意，是讓其半總統制的行政權中樞傾向在總統或總理身上。最後，本文也對臺灣的相關憲法設計，提出了延伸的討論和思考。
Semi-presidentialism has been a popular form of government in emerging democracies. However, systematic analyses on the presidents’ powers in policy-making or on the related mechanisms of their decision- making process have been scarce. To fill in the gap in the field, this article surveys the experiences of 21 democratic countries. With a focus on constitutional design of president’s powers in policy and decision-making mechanisms, this article also tries to discover their relationship with sub- types of semi-presidentialism. The results showed that the president’s power is crucial to political accountability of the government. When a country’s constitution does not explicitly give powers of policy making to its president, its constitutional system seems to fall into a type of premier-presidential. Finally, this article reflects some opportunities and challenges for constitutional design in Taiwan.
近年來，金融科技的興起帶來創新的金融服務並衝擊現有的監理方式。有些國家採取觀望的策略；有些國家則採取修改法律、推出新的執照制度甚或實驗型的監理模式。自2015年英國提出金融監理沙盒（Regulatory Sandbox）制度以來，許多國家陸續跟進，以監理沙盒實驗作為探索風險、重思監理疆界，並協助金融創新落地發展的措施。監理沙盒堪稱近年來擴散速度最快、影響最為深遠的一種新興金融監理制度。本文探究導致各國相繼採行金融監理沙盒制度的原因，並找出該制度在各國擴散的主要影響因子。藉由量化分析，本研..
In recent years, the rise of Fintech has introduced innovative financial services and has brought a significant impact on the existing financial regulatory frameworks. Financial regulators in different countries deal with the challenges in different ways: some adopt a “wait and see” strategy, in which they do not enact new regulatory institutions. Some countries take a more active approach through revision of laws, issuing new licenses, and adopting an experimental regulatory mechanism. Since the United Kingdom announced the fin..
法國與臺灣的政府體制都屬於半總統制，法國的憲政經驗中曾出現過三次的「左右共治」，臺灣的憲政經驗中卻從未出現過「藍綠共治」，何以如此?這是本文欲探討的課題。本文藉助賽局理論作為分析工具，探討制度安排如何影響行動者間的策略互動，以致最後產生了共治與否的差異。法國與臺灣擁有不同的選舉制度和不同的國會保障機制，在兩種制度因素的交互作用下，會引導分屬不同政黨陣營的總統和國會多數產生不同的政治計算與策略互動，最終導致法國出現「左右共治」，臺灣卻沒有出現「藍綠共治」。 ..
Both France and Taiwan’s political systems are semi-presidential. However, “cohabitation” in French constitutional experience has occurred three times while Taiwan has never seen “cohabitation” until now. Finding the reason for this difference is the central question of this paper. By using the game theory as an analysis tool, the paper explores how the institutional design influences the actors’ strategic interactions, which underlies the discrepancy between France and Taiwan in “coh..
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