本文主要研究問題是:中國大陸對於衝突預防的原則性立場與態度為何?在身為當事國與第三方行為者兩種不同身分時，其在實踐上有何不同?本文藉由南蘇丹危機與南海衝突兩個案例分析中國大陸在衝突預防實踐上，面對事關自身主權與國家利益以及與自身主權無關之衝突事件時，在衝突預防作為上有何差異?其宣示與實際作為有何落差?此外，為何中 國大陸在南海議題上，會由堅持雙邊對話，轉變為也同意透過多邊機制，作為處理南海主權爭議途徑的立場與作為?在這樣的雙邊與多邊機制下，呈現出怎樣的「中國..

The main research questions of the paper are as follow: first of all, what are China’s position, attitude, and actions in conflict prevention, second question is what is the difference between China’s action and statement on the issue of the South China Sea dispute and the South Sudan Crisis when China is one of the parties who faces sovereignty and national interest, and as a third- party in the practice of conflict prevention. Third question is why China is willing to change her position from insisting bilateral..

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上，美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜，混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件，美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述，單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議，以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例，試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例，美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..

美國在小布希與歐巴馬兩任政府主政時期，對馬來西亞的政策出現顯著差異。當前多數文獻以「雙邊─多邊」或「軍事─經濟」的兩組對照作為比較基礎，而本文在具體耙梳兩屆政府在美馬經貿與安全合作的政策異同之後，發現上述兩組對照分析模式有過於簡化之嫌，因此提出以外交取向的本質作為出發點，深入研究小布希與歐巴馬政府對馬政策的異同。以美馬反恐和南海議題上的合作為案例進行分析之後，本文發現小布希政府的對馬政策是功能取向的，因此著重對馬政策的工具性與利益界定，導致雙邊關係發展受限於..

Since the Obama administration initiated the “Rebalancing toward Asia” policy, development of US-Malaysia relationship has been one of the crucial topics. Many researchers have suggested that Obama’s policy toward Malaysia is more successful than that of Bush’s, and most works have followed the framework of “bilateralism vs. multilateralism” and “security- oriented vs. economy-oriented” to make a strategic comparison. This article examines such frameworks and argues that they ar..

2013 年 1 月 22 日，菲律賓依據聯合國海洋法公約第 15 部分第 287 條與 附件 7 之規定，片面對中國啟動關於南海海洋管轄權爭端的強制仲裁程序。 在中國聲明拒絕接受及參與此一程序的情況下，仲裁庭在 2015 年 10 月 29 日宣判對本案之管轄權成立，並於同年 11 月完成實質問題階段的開庭審理，預定 2016 年 6 月以前作出判決。菲律賓有計畫地設計對中國九段線及歷史性權利主張的法律戰，試圖瓦解中國的南海主張，對該主張的合法性帶來極大的..

On January 22 2013, Philippines unilaterally initiated compulsory arbitral procedure against China, in accordance with Part XV, Article 287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ), concerning matters relating to their disputes over maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea. China formally declared its objection against the procedure and refused to participate. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the Arbitral Tribunal established its jurisdiction on October 29 2015, and conducted hearings on merits ..

東協各國政府廣泛地認為，南海爭端是冷戰後東南亞主要的「衝突引爆點」。它也對東協的團結及其有關和平解決爭端的規範帶來了嚴峻的考驗。由於並非所有東協成員國都是南海島礁的聲索國，因此，東協對南海的共識與立場始終受到各國在南海不同利益的影響而罕有「一致性」，而東協決策的模式也顯示其南海政策立場的結構性問題。對南海衝突管理與海域劃界涉及的東協會員國至少有越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞與汶萊，印尼和新加坡的立場也值得關注。本文目的是探討作為一個整體的東協，如何回應南海緊張局勢的..

The South China Sea(SCS)dispute was widely viewed by ASEAN governments as the major ‘flashpoint of conflict’ in the post-Cold War Southeast Asia. It also posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and of its norms concerning peaceful settlements of disputes. Because not all ASEAN member countries are the claim countries of the SCS islands and reefs, therefore, the consensus and position of ASEAN on the SCS have always been rare "consistency" due to different interests in the SCS. ASEAN decision-making s..