各期期刊 All issues

英國脫歐議題及其對歐洲統合的意涵
Brexit and Its Implications for European Integration
羅至美(Chih-Mei Luo)
57卷3期(2018/09/01)

在歐盟慶祝羅馬條約 60 週年前夕,歐洲統合面臨了英國公民投票決定脫離歐盟的震撼。英國脫歐究竟對歐洲統合產生何種意涵?是歐盟內部一持續爭辯中的議題。本文的目的在回答以下的研究問題:英國脫歐對歐洲統合產生何種意涵?公投出現脫歐的結果對歐盟傳遞出何種訊息?歐盟領袖是否正確解讀了這些訊息與意涵並給予正確的政策回應?經檢視對立性的論點之後,本文認為在公投中所顯示出的多項特質──不同社經階級所呈現出對立性的分裂投票-凸顯了必須正視經濟不公與分配不正義的急迫性與必要性。..

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaty, European integration had suffered a setback with the U.K.’s decision to withdraw from the EU(Brexit). The implications for European integration are heavily contended in EU politics, but these are far from clear and will require further investigation. This paper attempts to explore the implications of Brexit for European integration. What messages does the U.K. referendum have for the EU? Have EU leaders interpreted these messages and implications and ..

試探美國外交政策訊號之操作:以 2012~16 年美國在南海爭議和 APEC 承諾為例
Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy Signals: Evidence from 2012 - 2016 U.S. Involvement in South China Sea Disputes and APEC Commitments
黃偉峰(David W. F. Huang)
57卷3期(2018/09/01)

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上,美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜,混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件,美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述,單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議,以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例,試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例,美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..

21世紀中國與印度競合模式分析
A Study of Competition-Cooperation Between India and China in the 21st Century
陳純如(Chun-Ju Chen)
57卷2期(2018/06/01)

本文從決策者角度探討中印關係中的競合模式。中印在國際間先後崛起之際,兩國之間充滿競爭與合作,且往往競爭多於合作。中印之間的競合模式多半是一種策略合作,進行務實的交往但保有平衡選擇。競合的時機取決於決策者對於議題相關成本與利益的考量。決策者希望在重要議題上合作,擱置爭議,為經濟發展創造一個和平的環境,但是保持可啟動平衡行動的選擇,作為避險。不過,因為缺乏互信,以及決策者面對的政治風險,有時策略合作中原本是備而不用的平衡選擇被啟動。例如,在 2013 ..

This article studies the competition-cooperation model between China and India from the perspective of decision-makers. While China and India experience fast economic growths, there are inevitably competition and cooperation between the two. The choice to cooperate or compete depends on how the decision-makers perceive the interest structure of the engagement of the two countries on issues. However, oftentime it is not easy to judge whether the two countries are in a zero-sum or non-zero sum game on one issue. “Strategi..

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