本文主要在探討泰國金融改革過程中，國內主要行為者之間的制度性關係。受到 1997 年金融風暴的影響，民主黨(Democrat Party)的乃川 (Chuan Leekpai)政府接受國際貨幣基金(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的建議與援助，從國家長期發展的角度出發，採取了相關的結構性改革政策。但是，2001 年上台的塔克辛(Thaksin Shinawatra)政府卻採取凱恩斯主義為主的民粹政策，希望可以在短期內達到金融穩定與刺激經濟成長。到底是乃川的政策抑或是塔克辛的政策成功帶領泰國走出金融風暴的陰影，並且有效達成金融改革與經濟復甦?在本文中使用兩項重要的制度變項:透明化(transparency)與問責(accountability)，以及兩項分析層次:治理結構 (governance structure)與監理架構(regulatory framework)來比較這兩任政策在金融改革政策上的差異。本文主張塔克辛經濟學(Thaksinomics)並不是經濟成長取向，而塔克辛也不是泰國後金融危機時代表現良好的關鍵因素。事實上，塔克辛政府只不過接收乃川政府時代所奠定下來經濟與金融穩定的基礎，因為乃川政府所採取的結構與政治改革，有效提升了泰國治理結構與監理架構的透明化與問責程度，因此造成後續金融改革的成功。

This paper explores the domestic institutional arrangements and relationships among key political and financial actors in the process of Thailand’s financial reform. Affected by the Asian 1997 financial crisis, the Chuan government adopted structural reform policies which were suggested by the IMF as a long-term solution. However, the Thaksin government which took office in 2001 adopted Keynesian and populist policies to stimulate economic growth and financial stability which focused on short term results. Whose policies should take credit for Thailand’s successful financial reform and economic recovery? This paper uses two institutional variables: transparency and accountability, and two analytical levels: governance structure and regulatory framework to compare the performance of the Chuan government and the Thaksin government in respect of their financial reform policies. It argues that Thaksinomics is not growth driven, and Thaksin also should not take entirely of the credit for Thailand’s post-crisis development. The Thaksin government benefited from the economic and financial stability laid down by the previous Chuan government. In conclusion, this study shows that previously established structural and political reform enhanced transparency and accountability of the governance structure and regulatory framework, thereby contributing to the successful financial reform.