本文從決策者角度探討中印關係中的競合模式。中印在國際間先後崛起之際，兩國之間充滿競爭與合作，且往往競爭多於合作。中印之間的競合模式多半是一種策略合作，進行務實的交往但保有平衡選擇。競合的時機取決於決策者對於議題相關成本與利益的考量。決策者希望在重要議題上合作，擱置爭議，為經濟發展創造一個和平的環境，但是保持可啟動平衡行動的選擇，作為避險。不過，因為缺乏互信，以及決策者面對的政治風險，有時策略合作中原本是備而不用的平衡選擇被啟動。例如，在 2013 ..

This article studies the competition-cooperation model between China and India from the perspective of decision-makers. While China and India experience fast economic growths, there are inevitably competition and cooperation between the two. The choice to cooperate or compete depends on how the decision-makers perceive the interest structure of the engagement of the two countries on issues. However, oftentime it is not easy to judge whether the two countries are in a zero-sum or non-zero sum game on one issue. “Strategi..

國家間發生領土爭端時，常以展現或威脅使用軍事力量為主要威逼手段，若爭端國互不相讓，往往會陷入緊張的軍事對峙，隨時可能升級為全面武裝衝突。本文檢視此類不實際動武的軍事對峙，並提出兩個因素可有助緩和軍事對峙。首先，反覆僵持的爭端使雙方主動管理對峙行為，避免容易造成衝突升級的意外;再者，未定邊界或領土為雙方使用武力的緩衝地帶，針對爭議領土展示或威脅使用武力變成可理解的經常事件，對爭端國而言，爭議區域的武裝對峙或軍事行動不被視為立即的挑戰或威脅，衝突方傾向避免對峙惡..

States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territo..