2005年,印度與中國建立了「戰略合作夥伴關係」(strategic cooperative partnership),給予外界中印關係改善的印象。在現實情況中,中印的戰略夥伴關係呈現出在安全與經濟上的落差,較類似兩個原本敵意深重的發展中國家,為了經濟發展所進行的策略聯盟,以經濟發展為重,而與安全合作及解決主權與邊界爭議較無關。本文從決策者進行合作時的利益與成本考量的角度,探討中印「戰略夥伴關係」的發展前景。中印建構戰略夥伴關係,是決策者嘗試合作;是否能成功,取決於合作決策者認為合作能得到的利益比不合作得到的利益要來得高。在合作利益與各種合作成本的考量之下,包括決策者的政治利益與風險考量,形塑了中印戰略夥伴關係的原則以及特點,包括「發展中國家」身分、經濟主軸、強調平等、以及變動性。但是這些原則與特點,有時反而會增加中印之間的信任赤字,對於中印戰略夥伴關係的發展與政經與安全方面的合作,造成局限性。「戰略夥伴關係」是務實交往的策略之一,短期內可維持邊界的和平,但未來實質合作的發展性將可能受到限制。
In 2005, China and India established a “strategic cooperative partnership,” which led to rising optimism about China-India relations. This article discusses prospects of the China-India strategic partnership from the perspective of benefit and cost. The China-India strategic partnership is regarded as an attempt by the leaders of the two countries to change bilateral relations from non-cooperation to cooperation. The key to successful transformation lies in the fact that decision makers of both sides can recognize that common interests gained from cooperation is higher than interests gained from non-cooperation and independent action. A lack of mutual trust between China and India is the main reason for high costs of cooperation. The foundation and principles upon which the strategic partnership is constructed, characteristics of common interests including common identity as developing countries, economy focus, emphasis on equality, volatility, often increase the trust deficit. As a result, cooperation between China and India on politics, economy and security has been limited. For China and India, the strategic cooperative partnership has been a move of pragmatic engagement. In the short term, peace along the border can be maintained. However, substantial cooperation for mid- and long-term might be limited.
本文旨在探討歐盟與中國如何實踐戰略夥伴關係的目標,以及分析在過程中所面臨的阻礙。本文從歐盟與中國如何認知自身國際地位開始,檢視雙方從夥伴關係走向戰略夥伴關係的期望,評估在實質上是否具有此等關係的基礎,以及雙方為何在解除對中國軍售禁令以及承認中國市場經濟地位此二議題上遲遲無法取得共識。本文認為歐盟和中國對於戰略夥伴關係的認知並不明確,在具體議題上缺乏實質合作,因而難以取得突破性的發展。現今歐盟與中國的交往已經進入「務實省思期」,雙方都必須思考如何在現有的框架對..
This article aims to examine the implementation of shaping the EU- China Strategic Partnership and investigate the obstacles they are encountering. Accordingly, the article will answer the following questions: (1)How do the EU and China define their strategic objectives?(2)What do they expect from the implementation of the strategic partnership?(3)Do they have fundamental consensus and benchmarks to shape this relationship? (4)Why does the EU reject to lift the arms embargo against China and refuse to recognise China’s ..
國家間發生領土爭端時,常以展現或威脅使用軍事力量為主要威逼手段,若爭端國互不相讓,往往會陷入緊張的軍事對峙,隨時可能升級為全面武裝衝突。本文檢視此類不實際動武的軍事對峙,並提出兩個因素可有助緩和軍事對峙。首先,反覆僵持的爭端使雙方主動管理對峙行為,避免容易造成衝突升級的意外;再者,未定邊界或領土為雙方使用武力的緩衝地帶,針對爭議領土展示或威脅使用武力變成可理解的經常事件,對爭端國而言,爭議區域的武裝對峙或軍事行動不被視為立即的挑戰或威脅,衝突方傾向避免對峙惡..
States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territo..
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