受到中央集權歷史傳統之影響,法國地方建制乃是以「鞏固行政權」或 「代行行政權」為特色;即使歷經了兩波「去中央集權化」,法國的行政權優勢性依然扮演重要角色,且造成中央集權與「地方分權」並進之現象。在進入第五共和時期後,「強行政、弱立法」的制度特徵,以及隨著修憲而逐步建立的「體制大總統化」,更確認了法國總統在行政權運作當中的核心定位,並使「優勢行政權」成為論述法國政治發展的重點。
從憲政研究的角度來看,論者經常是以「總統化」闡述法國憲政運作當中有關總理對政策的主導性低,或者國會無力制衡等問題;然而,若回到中央集權與優勢行政權的關連,則法國中央地方關係的治理架構,在中央集權與地方分權並進下,卻呈現更為複雜之樣態,並牽動優勢行政權的展現。另外,由於法國國會議員普遍兼任地方職的身分,使得探討憲政運作中的行政權優勢時同樣無法忽略國會議員與地方團體之連結,更顯示出中央地方關係理應成為探究法國憲政運作的重要面向。職此,本文將說明,法國一方面受到中央集權的歷史背景以及第五共和憲政運作之影響,使法國總統成為政治集權的重要象徵;另一方面,正是基於優勢行政權的政治發展特徵,導致法國地方行政首長與中央政府的政治角力,而國會議員兼任地方職等因素,也連帶牽動了行政權運作,和行政、立法互動關係。
This paper reinvestigates dominant executive power in France. Due to France’s historical background as a highly centralized state, local governments play a role in “consolidating” or “acting for” executive power. Even though France has encountered two waves of reforms of decentralization, executive power is still more dominant than legislative power, a characteristic of the Fifth Republic. Nevertheless, amendments to the constitution have placed the President at the center of the operations of executive power, which results in a highly “presidentialized” semi- presidential regime. Therefore, the phenomenon of executive dominance is crucial for discussions of political development in France. In reference to constitutional operations in France, most literature on constitutional research has stated the problems in Prime Minister’s role in policy-making process or Parliament’s inability to supervise executive power from the perspective of “presidentialization.” However, concerning the relation between power centralization and executive dominance, connection between legislators (many of whom held local position)and local autonomous groups, the central-local administrative structure show greater complexity in influencing dominant executive power.. Thus, the central-local relationship is a vital issue in discussing constitutional operations in France.
This paper argues that dominant executive power in France has two features. On one hand, the President is the head of both the central government and local affairs due to France’s history. On the other hand, political struggles between local executive heads and the central government as well as members of Parliament who held local positions also influence executive power and executive-legislative interactions from the bottom.
作為德國歷史上的第一個民主政體─威瑪共和從誕生開始就是一個「生病的民主」,也是一個「沒有民主人的民主」。威瑪憲法的制定者除了架構起所謂的「程序性民主」之外,同時更在議會制的基礎上賦予民選的總統強大的權力─半總統制,加上欠缺民主文化,以及存在著反體制的政黨,致令威瑪憲法像是特洛伊木馬。最後在議會政治失敗的亂局中,希特勒(Adolf Hitler)率領納粹黨徒從木馬中一躍而出,用原本是保護民主的權力將民主政體合法地謀殺掉。 二戰後的聯邦德國..
As the first democracy in German history, the Weimar Republic was “a sick democracy”, and “a democracy without democrats” ever since it was born. The composers of the Weimar Constitution not only constructed a so-called “procedural democracy”, but also gave the extreme power to the people-elected president – semi-presidentialism – based on the foundation of parliamentary system. Furthermore, accompanied with a political climate that lacked democratic culture and existing parties..
傳統的研究智慧中,總統制和兩黨制的配套被認為是一個民主國家較容易運作的組合。主要的理由是兩黨制較不可能出現意識形態的極化,以及因為兩個政黨需要贏得中間位置的選票,其可以促成政黨之間較溫和及向心的競爭,因而有助於總統制的運作。然而,近年來,一些兩黨總統制國家發生嚴重的憲政危機,甚至促成民主衰退。為何這些兩黨總統制國家會走上民主衰退的道路,是本文所要探索的研究問題。首先,本文透過對於拉丁美洲兩黨總統制國家的個案分析發現,憲政結構的因素如總統和國會的權力抗衡會影響..
Past research argues that presidentialism and two-party systems are workable combinations that can facilitate democratic stability. The causal mechanisms are that ideological polarization is less possible to appear in a two-party system, that two parties needing to win votes from the center encourages moderation, and that the absence of the extremist parties and the centripetal nature of party competition favor democratic stability. However, in recent years, some presidential countries with a two-party system in Latin America..
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