本文從決策者角度探討中印關係中的競合模式。中印在國際間先後崛起之際，兩國之間充滿競爭與合作，且往往競爭多於合作。中印之間的競合模式多半是一種策略合作，進行務實的交往但保有平衡選擇。競合的時機取決於決策者對於議題相關成本與利益的考量。決策者希望在重要議題上合作，擱置爭議，為經濟發展創造一個和平的環境，但是保持可啟動平衡行動的選擇，作為避險。不過，因為缺乏互信，以及決策者面對的政治風險，有時策略合作中原本是備而不用的平衡選擇被啟動。例如，在 2013 年中，習近平與李克強為鞏固權力的避險動作，使得中國在邊界問題上立場保持強硬，導致互相平衡動作，使邊界變得緊張。但是，如果啟動平衡是為了促進合作的手段，則衝突升高的可能性就不高;不過對促進合作亦無實質幫助，反而加深不信任，限制了未來實質合作的發展性。印度在 2014 年產生新的執政者，面對要鞏固權力的習李政府，將會對中印之間的合作嘗試，產生新的挑戰。
This article studies the competition-cooperation model between China and India from the perspective of decision-makers. While China and India experience fast economic growths, there are inevitably competition and cooperation between the two. The choice to cooperate or compete depends on how the decision-makers perceive the interest structure of the engagement of the two countries on issues. However, oftentime it is not easy to judge whether the two countries are in a zero-sum or non-zero sum game on one issue. “Strategic cooperation” has frequently been adopted, which in its ideal form combines practical engagement with an open option of balance. The decision-makers of China and India want to cooperate on important issues and set aside disputes in order to create a peaceful environment for economic development whilst maintaining the option of activating balance act for hedging purposes. However, due to the volatility of interest structures, lack of mutual trusts and the political risks faced by decision-makers, sometimes, the balance act in the “strategic cooperation” is activated and led to mutual re- balancing. In 2013, the need of the new Chinese leadership to consolidate power reinforced China’s tough stands on border issue, leading to mutual re- balance and tension on the border. However, given that the balance act was taken in order to push forward cooperation and relieve domestic tension, it is unlikely that border tension will escalate.It will not improve cooperation but will deepen mutual distrust and limit the development of bilateral relations in the future. In 2014, a new government was elected in India and the new leadership might cast new challenges on the bilateral relations.
2017 年 6 月 18 日起，中印在洞朗地區(Doklam)對峙近兩月，造成中印邊界情況一時緊張，雖然兩方最後是在金磚五國峰會進行數日前解除對峙狀況，但是洞朗地區依然是餘波盪漾，兩方軍隊也並未撤軍，反而繼續在洞朗地區駐紮。洞朗事件爭論的焦點，表面雖然事涉洞朗的主權，但是深一層的原因可能是印度更擔心中方的修路行動將對印度的東北部，包括阿魯那恰爾邦(藏南地區)，產生戰略威脅。洞朗事件後，中印在邊界的互動模式將有所改變，而邊界氣氛緊張，也影響邊界談判，雙方雖在..
A military standoff lasted for over two months in Doklam between China and India since mid-June 2017, causing tension at the border. Although eventually the two sides disengaged days before the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, tension and speculations lingered in Doklam and troops are seen stationed in the area even in winter. The incident originates from the sovereignty dispute of Doklam, but at a deeper level, India has been concerned that China’s road construction in the area would cause strategic threats to the northeast, in..
States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territo..
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