2017 年 6 月 18 日起，中印在洞朗地區(Doklam)對峙近兩月，造成中印邊界情況一時緊張，雖然兩方最後是在金磚五國峰會進行數日前解除對峙狀況，但是洞朗地區依然是餘波盪漾，兩方軍隊也並未撤軍，反而繼續在洞朗地區駐紮。洞朗事件爭論的焦點，表面雖然事涉洞朗的主權，但是深一層的原因可能是印度更擔心中方的修路行動將對印度的東北部，包括阿魯那恰爾邦(藏南地區)，產生戰略威脅。洞朗事件後，中印在邊界的互動模式將有所改變，而邊界氣氛緊張，也影響邊界談判，雙方雖在 2017 年 12 月舉行 了第 20 次特別代表會談，但進展仍局限在管控衝突爭議，維持和諧等原則上的議題。洞朗事件也反映中印在南亞地區爭奪勢力範圍的攻防，未來印度對於中國在南亞地區的一舉一動，只會給予給更高度的警戒與關注。
A military standoff lasted for over two months in Doklam between China and India since mid-June 2017, causing tension at the border. Although eventually the two sides disengaged days before the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, tension and speculations lingered in Doklam and troops are seen stationed in the area even in winter. The incident originates from the sovereignty dispute of Doklam, but at a deeper level, India has been concerned that China’s road construction in the area would cause strategic threats to the northeast, including Arunachal. In the wake of the Doklam incident, interaction between Chinese and Indian troops at the border has changed and border talks affected. In December 2017, special representatives of China and India met for the 20th border meeting, yet nothing substantial occurred and the two sides only reiterated principles on border issues such as maintaining peace. The Doklam incident also reflects the competition between China and India over the sphere of influence in South Asia. In the future, India will only pay more attention and be on high alert about any move by China in the region.
本文從決策者角度探討中印關係中的競合模式。中印在國際間先後崛起之際，兩國之間充滿競爭與合作，且往往競爭多於合作。中印之間的競合模式多半是一種策略合作，進行務實的交往但保有平衡選擇。競合的時機取決於決策者對於議題相關成本與利益的考量。決策者希望在重要議題上合作，擱置爭議，為經濟發展創造一個和平的環境，但是保持可啟動平衡行動的選擇，作為避險。不過，因為缺乏互信，以及決策者面對的政治風險，有時策略合作中原本是備而不用的平衡選擇被啟動。例如，在 2013 ..
This article studies the competition-cooperation model between China and India from the perspective of decision-makers. While China and India experience fast economic growths, there are inevitably competition and cooperation between the two. The choice to cooperate or compete depends on how the decision-makers perceive the interest structure of the engagement of the two countries on issues. However, oftentime it is not easy to judge whether the two countries are in a zero-sum or non-zero sum game on one issue. “Strategi..
國家間發生領土爭端時，常以展現或威脅使用軍事力量為主要威逼手段，若爭端國互不相讓，往往會陷入緊張的軍事對峙，隨時可能升級為全面武裝衝突。本文檢視此類不實際動武的軍事對峙，並提出兩個因素可有助緩和軍事對峙。首先，反覆僵持的爭端使雙方主動管理對峙行為，避免容易造成衝突升級的意外;再者，未定邊界或領土為雙方使用武力的緩衝地帶，針對爭議領土展示或威脅使用武力變成可理解的經常事件，對爭端國而言，爭議區域的武裝對峙或軍事行動不被視為立即的挑戰或威脅，衝突方傾向避免對峙惡..
States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territo..
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