受到中央集權歷史傳統之影響,法國地方建制乃是以「鞏固行政權」或 「代行行政權」為特色;即使歷經了兩波「去中央集權化」,法國的行政權優勢性依然扮演重要角色,且造成中央集權與「地方分權」並進之現象。在進入第五共和時期後,「強行政、弱立法」的制度特徵,以及隨著修憲而逐步建立的「體制大總統化」,更確認了法國總統在行政權運作當中的核心定位,並使「優勢行政權」成為論述法國政治發展的重點。
從憲政研究的角度來看,論者經常是以「總統化」闡述法國憲政運作當中有關總理對政策的主導性低,或者國會無力制衡等問題;然而,若回到中央集權與優勢行政權的關連,則法國中央地方關係的治理架構,在中央集權與地方分權並進下,卻呈現更為複雜之樣態,並牽動優勢行政權的展現。另外,由於法國國會議員普遍兼任地方職的身分,使得探討憲政運作中的行政權優勢時同樣無法忽略國會議員與地方團體之連結,更顯示出中央地方關係理應成為探究法國憲政運作的重要面向。職此,本文將說明,法國一方面受到中央集權的歷史背景以及第五共和憲政運作之影響,使法國總統成為政治集權的重要象徵;另一方面,正是基於優勢行政權的政治發展特徵,導致法國地方行政首長與中央政府的政治角力,而國會議員兼任地方職等因素,也連帶牽動了行政權運作,和行政、立法互動關係。
This paper reinvestigates dominant executive power in France. Due to France’s historical background as a highly centralized state, local governments play a role in “consolidating” or “acting for” executive power. Even though France has encountered two waves of reforms of decentralization, executive power is still more dominant than legislative power, a characteristic of the Fifth Republic. Nevertheless, amendments to the constitution have placed the President at the center of the operations of executive power, which results in a highly “presidentialized” semi- presidential regime. Therefore, the phenomenon of executive dominance is crucial for discussions of political development in France. In reference to constitutional operations in France, most literature on constitutional research has stated the problems in Prime Minister’s role in policy-making process or Parliament’s inability to supervise executive power from the perspective of “presidentialization.” However, concerning the relation between power centralization and executive dominance, connection between legislators (many of whom held local position)and local autonomous groups, the central-local administrative structure show greater complexity in influencing dominant executive power.. Thus, the central-local relationship is a vital issue in discussing constitutional operations in France.
This paper argues that dominant executive power in France has two features. On one hand, the President is the head of both the central government and local affairs due to France’s history. On the other hand, political struggles between local executive heads and the central government as well as members of Parliament who held local positions also influence executive power and executive-legislative interactions from the bottom.
在美國歷史上所簽訂的 14 項 FTA 中,NAFTA 與 CAFTA-DR 最能展現總統與國會在 FTA 政策制訂上所扮演角色與影響決策的程度,故本文以此兩項 FTA 作為研究美國 FTA 決策主體的案例。研究發現,在對外政策的決策主體的三種不同的模式:總統主導模式、國會主導模式與互動模式中,總統模式最能解釋美國 FTA 政策。總統具有龐大的國內外行政資源與政黨力量,可以干預國會的決策並改變個別議員的投票傾向,在不影響 FTA 基本內涵與目的下促使國會通過..
Among all 14 FTA’s signed by the U.S. in history, NAFTA and CAFTA-DR - selected by this paper as cases to identify the entity that owns the power of dominating the U.S. FTA policy - most represent the dynamics and impacts of President and Congress on the FTA policy formation. The research shows that among the three models of decision-making entities of foreign policy - President, Congress, and Interaction, the President model best explains the decision-making of FTA policies. President controls enormous external and int..
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