法國第五共和體制向為半總統制的主要原型典範,並為穩定半總統制的代表,但法國各界對此一制度設計一直有著許多爭論與修改意見。2007 年法國總統大選前,各主要政黨候選人紛紛提出「第六共和」(la VIe République)的憲政倡議。法國新任總統薩科奇(Nicolas Sarkozy)於 2008 年進行自 1958 年第五共和以來最大規模的一次修憲。修憲主要方向同時強化總統與國會的權力,在總統權力部分修憲後強化總統的國會咨文權,形同間接賦予總統的行政優勢地位,彰顯總統為國家大政決定者的憲政負責角色,加之 2000 年後總統選舉時程改變形成多數執政的政治事實,已然增加鞏固總統的憲政角色與強化總統政治權力。
法國藉由調整總統選舉時程與任期以解決總統多數與國會多數不一致 (incongruence)的半總統制典型制度困境,促使總統在憲政地位上有著實質的轉變。首先,總統任期縮短與國會一致並採「先總統、後國會」的蜜月期(honeymoon election)選舉時程改革,產生總統與國會多數一致的衣尾效應(coattail effect),縮減了共治機會的產生,並增加鞏固總統的憲政角色與強化總統權力。再者,2007 年國會選舉結果也呈現了法國總統多數聯盟取得絕對優勢,左右兩大黨在國會席次上取得壓倒性不對稱的席次分配 (disproportionality),小黨勢力迅速衰退,兩大黨政治生態的逐漸鞏固化,這些因素都促使法國政治體系朝向「體制大總統化」的傾斜演化方向。
The French Fifth Republic (la Ve République) is not only the prototype of semi-presidentialism but also the typical model of “stable semi- presidentialism,” of which the French political circle and academia have never stopped their criticism over the design of the French Fifth Republic and have consistently expressed their opinions of modification. Even before the 2007 French presidential election, most of the major parties simultaneously advocated a new constitutional engineering plans of “la VIe République” (the Sixth Republic)to modify the French Fifth Republic essentially. In 2008, newly-elected president Nicolas Sarkozy launched constitutional adjustment on a large scale to increase the powers of president and parliament simultaneously. In the part of presidential power, the enhancement of the power of State of the Union Address of president endows indirectly the president more administrative preeminence.
To resolve the major problems of incongruence and cohabitation - the Achille’s heel of semi-presidentialism, France has adjusted the election schedule in 2000. The consistency between the presidential term and the parliamentary term as well as the honeymoon election schedule reform of presidential election first and then parliamentary election have generated the coattail effect and increased the possibility of consistency of the presidential majority and parliamentary majority. These outcomes resulted in a sharp shrinkage of cohabitation opportunity, and in turns strengthened the presidential power. Furthermore, the result of parliamentary election in 2007 also revealed the rapid declination of the radical parties and the development of two major parties system. All these factors attribute to the future development of présidentialisme.
半總統制是新興民主國家廣為採用的政府制度類型,而現有關於半總統制的研究不論是著重憲法規範或實證行為面向,對於總統常態性的政策權限設計和相關的決策機關配置的系統性探討較為欠缺。本文試圖藉由包括臺灣在內共 21 個半總統制民主國家憲法設計的探索,讓半總統制的研究和理論能觸及總統常態性的治理課題,是半總統制研究中的新嘗試。本文焦點在於系統性解析多個國家憲法中總統的政策權與決策機關之設計模式,並進一步探討其與半總統制憲法上的次類型和實際的運作類型之關係。藉由多國案例..
Semi-presidentialism has been a popular form of government in emerging democracies. However, systematic analyses on the presidents’ powers in policy-making or on the related mechanisms of their decision- making process have been scarce. To fill in the gap in the field, this article surveys the experiences of 21 democratic countries. With a focus on constitutional design of president’s powers in policy and decision-making mechanisms, this article also tries to discover their relationship with sub- types of semi-pre..
半總統制的設計,通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下,由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施,國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量,則在文獻上甚少探討,也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國,並從較傳統的制度面切入,來探究兩國在制度設計安排上,賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排,主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..
The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..
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