在食品安全暨衛生這個議題領域中,消費者、業者、政府是三個最主要的行為者(actors)。理論上,當此三個行為者的地位在市場上處於均衡狀態,就算彼此偏好(preferences)不同,食安品質仍得以維持一定水準。惟業者多半在實際上享有資訊優勢,並藉由此種優勢地位在市場交易過程中取得主導性影響,致使政府經常與其靠攏或是消費者受其宰制。有趣的是,臺灣因近幾年接續爆發各式各類食安醜聞,於是政府開始頻繁地修正食安法規並積極地介入市場進行管理。這使得上述三個行為者在食安法制中的「權責分配」出現明顯「失衡」,特別是業者承擔的義務量被大幅調升,而政府承擔的管理責任也明顯加重。本文認為,此種「失衡」現象不僅導致臺灣食安醜聞不減反增,還可能惡化三個主要行為者在市場上的互動,甚至催生仇敵文化,讓現行《食品安全衛生管理法》具有「敵人食安法制」的性質。鑒此,本文建議食安問題的治理需要認真思考如何較為妥適地分配消費者、業者、政府三方之權利與責任,同時藉助風險溝通機制來緩解目前市場與法制中的失衡問題。
Consumers, the food industry, and the government are the main actors in the area of food safety and the embedded domain of public health. Theoretically, only by balancing power among the three actors will desired food safety be maintained, even though the three actors have different preferences. Nevertheless, the industry frequently plays the leading role in the market because of its superiority in information possession. Thus, the government usually leans toward collaborating with the industry, leaveing consumers under industry domination in the long run. In recent years, food scandals broke out one after another in Taiwan, forcing the government to amend the Act for governing food safety and public health, while hoping to better manage the market. Yet, the government’s response to address food safety caused an imbalance of rights and liabilities distribution among the three actors. Particularly, the obligations of the food industry increased, and the responsibilities of the government extended. This paper argues that such imbalance not only induced the incremental incidence of food scandals in Taiwan over the past years, but also worsened the interaction between the three actors, sharpening hostility among the three parties. As a result, the Taiwan’s Act Governing Food Sanitation has features of the law of the enemy. This article argues for the appropriate distribution of rights and liabilities of the three actors, and risk communication as remedy to the imbalance in the market and legislation.
現有國際關係對於霸權的已有論述,大多試圖描述國際體系出現逐霸國家的原因,卻少有探索逐霸國家的行為策略,對於逐霸國家如何克服各種挑戰,組建層級霸權秩序,尚未提出具體的分析模型。本文擬填補逐霸理論空白,概念化逐霸國家行為,提出逐霸分析架構,觀察逐霸國家在逐霸過程中如何克服競逐資格,地位汰除,以及新層級秩序組建的三大挑戰。戰國時代秦國先後淘汰魏國、楚國與齊國等逐霸競爭對手的歷程,是本文的研究樣本。公元前356年秦孝公變法改革,秦國強固內部統治權威,運用內部權力成長途徑(Internal Pow..
Existing International Relations Studies’ arguments on the hegemony are mostly satisfied with describing the birth of hegemon in the international system, but rarely explored its behavior and strategies for obtaining the supreme status of hegemony. There is no specific research framework for exploring how the aspiring hegemon overcomes challenges and establishes a hierarchical hegemonic order in the international society. This paper intends to fill the theoretical gap of hegemony studies, conceptualizes aspiring hegemon’s behavi..
柔性平衡理論以不同於傳統平衡論的觀點解讀國家行為與互動,其認為國家在威脅不明或與他國利益相連等情況下,將透過迂迴隱晦的方式進行平衡。該理論近年來在國際關係學界中漸受關注,研究者們不僅運用其解讀現實案例,也對理論內涵提出許多評述與論辯。本文在回顧既有論著的基礎上探討該理論之內容並檢視各類平衡策略形態,以期呈現柔性平衡理論當前的整體發展狀況,並釐清其內容中的爭議處,以推動後續研究的進一步深化。
The theory of “soft balancing” deals with the actions and interactions among states that is different from traditional balancing theories. The former features a belief that states achieve balances among themselves in indirect and covert ways under uncertain threats and interests pegged with other states. During the past few years, the theory of soft balancing has gradually gained prominence in academic circles of international relations. Researchers not only apply the theory while interpreting actual cases, but al..
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