傳統的研究智慧中,總統制和兩黨制的配套被認為是一個民主國家較容易運作的組合。主要的理由是兩黨制較不可能出現意識形態的極化,以及因為兩個政黨需要贏得中間位置的選票,其可以促成政黨之間較溫和及向心的競爭,因而有助於總統制的運作。然而,近年來,一些兩黨總統制國家發生嚴重的憲政危機,甚至促成民主衰退。為何這些兩黨總統制國家會走上民主衰退的道路,是本文所要探索的研究問題。首先,本文透過對於拉丁美洲兩黨總統制國家的個案分析發現,憲政結構的因素如總統和國會的權力抗衡會影響兩黨總統制運作的成功或是失敗。本文經由對哥斯大黎加以及 1993 年 之前的委內瑞拉的個案說明,弱權總統對強權國會的憲政結構,較能促進兩黨總統制民主的成功運作。其次,從 1993 年到 1999 年的委內瑞拉和哥倫比亞的例子說明,強權總統對強權國會的憲政結構,促成兩黨總統制國家出現嚴重的憲政危機和民主衰退。本文的分析說明了總統制和兩黨制配套的情形下,強權總統和強權國會之權力抗衡會導致民主衰退。
Past research argues that presidentialism and two-party systems are workable combinations that can facilitate democratic stability. The causal mechanisms are that ideological polarization is less possible to appear in a two-party system, that two parties needing to win votes from the center encourages moderation, and that the absence of the extremist parties and the centripetal nature of party competition favor democratic stability. However, in recent years, some presidential countries with a two-party system in Latin America have suffered serious constitutional crises, thereby causing democratic decay. This paper aims to answer why these presidential countries with a two-party system have gone the way of democratic decay. After analyzing the cases of presidential countries with a two-party system in Latin America, this paper shows that the constitutional structure, especially balancing between the president and congress, affects the success or failure of operation of presidential countries with a two-party system. First, presidentialism in Costa Rica and Venezuela(1961-1993)illustrate that the constitutional structure, weak president versus strong congress, facilitates democracy in these two countries. Second, presidentialism in Venezuela (1993-1999)and in Columbia present that the constitutional structure, strong president versus strong congress, brings about democratic decay. This paper argues that the success or failure of democratic operation in presidential countries with a two-party system depends on the balancing of inter-branch power.
本文探討半總統制下的立法課責,以臺灣與法國為個案進行比較研究。「立法課責」指如何讓立法者(集體或個別)的所作所為能為利害關係人知道,而據以獎懲。過去比較臺、法的研究發現,總理總統制的法國,國會的運作型態較偏內閣制;總統議會制的臺灣,運作則較偏總統制,因而在傳統印象上,多會認為法國會較重視以政黨為對象的集體課責,臺灣則可能較偏重以候選人或立委為對象的個別課責。 本文乃透過制度規範上對選舉前與選舉後的資訊公開要求,比較臺灣與法國在集體課責與個別課..
This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s p..
半總統制的設計,通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下,由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施,國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量,則在文獻上甚少探討,也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國,並從較傳統的制度面切入,來探究兩國在制度設計安排上,賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排,主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..
The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..
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