2015 年 7 月,希臘的公民投票以 61%的多數否決了歐盟的第三次紓困案,希臘主權債務危機再起。基於國際資金自 2010 年起已陸續處分希臘資產,其他歐債危機國家亦陸續走向經濟復甦的現實下,此次希臘債務危機對全球與歐盟經濟影響有限。希臘公投事件主要影響的是本國利益,公投為希臘換來更嚴格的紓困條件,反轉了復甦中的經濟成長,同時賠上了僅存的政府信譽與國際信任。從希臘是歐債危機國家中唯一被紓困三次、債務減少一 半、獲得最多金援、五年來卻仍未有效控制危機等多項「希臘例外」的事實觀察,IMF 所堅持的債務減記(debt relief)與所批評的財政撙節並非是阻礙危機解決的要件,歐盟紓困金額的規模與次數亦非是終結危機的保證,希臘政府的改革與重建才是結束危機的答案。基此,本文主張,第三次紓困方案中,歐盟對希臘政府治理與經濟主權廣泛地干預與監管,可視為希臘治理改革的轉捩點與終結危機的必要步驟。
The EU’s bailout package was vetoed by the Greek people in the referendum of July 2015. This unexpected outcome caused the recurrence of the Greek debt crisis. Since international investors have disposed their holdings on Greek assets and other crisis countries in the eurozone have been recovering from the European sovereign debt crisis, the Greek event had limited impact on the world and EU economies this time. What this referendum event has affected most was its own national interests. It not only resulted in stricter bailout conditions afterwards, reversed the recovering trend of the Greek economy, but also damaged the reputation of the Greek government and international trust. Greek is the only euro country that has been bailed out for three times, the only euro country with special treatment of debt relief of 50%, and the only euro country that has been offered the largest amount of international financing without fully controlling the crisis after 5 years. Given these “Greece-exceptions,” debt relieves and austerities were not impediments to the resolution of the Greek crisis, nor would number of bailouts provide any guarantee to an end of crisis. In fact, reforms and capacity-rebuilding from the Greek administration hold the answers to crisis resolution. This paper, accordingly, argues that EU’s extensive intervention in Greece’s economic sovereignty and supervision of the Greek administration were the turning points of reforming its governance and the necessary steps to ending the Greek crisis.
在議會內閣制下,聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題,而許多學者也同意,政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說,參與聯合政府的政黨 ,有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論,再透過相關的文獻回顧,檢視在共同治理的過程中,有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為,以及這些制度的成效。最後,本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向,提出簡單的幾個建議。
While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the ins..
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