美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上，美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜，混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件，美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述，單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議，以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例，試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例，美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..

美國為因應後冷戰時期國際安全環境與威脅的改變，至 1996 年止已執行多次全面性的兵力結構檢討。然而，國會認為國防部僅考量維持現有規模與預算，而非依外在安全環境與威脅的改變來調整所需兵力結構。因此，國會為因應二十一世紀的威脅及確保美國國家安全利益，通過「1996 年軍力結構總檢法案」，要求國防部配合總統任期執行「四年期國防總檢」及將評估重點予以法制化。鑑於國內學術界對美國「四年期國防總檢」的論述均以報告內容為重點，故本文將從理性決策與戰略規劃面向，來評析美國..

In response to the changes of international security environment and threat in the post-Cold War era, the United States had conducted various comprehensive assessment of its force structure in 1990-1996 periods. However, the Congress pointed out the Department of Defense intended to realign the force structure just from the view of keeping forces size and defense budget and not from the changes of security environment and threat. In order to meet the threats and protect the U.S. national security interests in the twenty-first..