在議會內閣制下，聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題，而許多學者也同意，政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說，參與聯合政府的政黨 ，有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論，再透過相關的文獻回顧，檢視在共同治理的過程中，有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為，以及這些制度的成效。最後，本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向，提出簡單的幾個建議。

While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the ins..

半總統制的聯合內閣如何形成？半總統制下的總統如何影響內閣的組 成和運作？聯合內閣不同的運作模式如何影響聯合內閣的存續？是本文主 要的研究問題。本文的結論如下：第一、中東歐多數的半總統制國家之總 統是屬於無黨籍總統，憲法規定當選之後必須退出政黨運作。然而這些無 黨籍總統並沒有退居二線或是扮演超然中立的角色，依然會運作其憲法上 的權威主導或是介入內閣的運作。特別是當國會沒有任何一個政黨控制過 半數時，總統可以主導選擇結盟的政黨對象，藉由組合多數..

The main research questions addressed in this paper are: How does a coalition cabinet form in a semi-presidential system, in what ways does the president influence its formation and operation, and how do different modes of coalition governance affect cabinet durability? The conclusions are as follows: Firstly, in many semi-presidential countries in Eastern Europe, the president is a non-partisan f igure constitutionally required to withdraw from partisan politics after election. However, these non-partisan presidents..