WTO爭端解決機制一向被譽為皇冠上之珍珠，如今上訴機構陷入停擺危機，反而成為皇冠上之荊棘。過去數年來，美國運用WTO所要求之共識，屢次反對上訴機構成員之選任案，尤其是川普政府上台後更加強杯葛之力道。根據爭端解決規則暨程序瞭解書之規定，上訴案件最少由三名成員審理並作成裁決。然而2019年12月10日之後，上訴機構已無法正常運作。長期以來美國對上訴機構提出許多批評，包括系統性、實質性與程序性問題;反之，許多WTO會員則急於補實懸缺，而疏於處理美國關切之事項。根據爭端解決規則暨程序瞭解書第3...

The dispute settlement system, often considered as the “crown jewel” of the WTO, is in a present crisis and becomes the crown of thorns. Over the past years, the United States through the use of the WTO’s consensus requirements has successfully blocked the launch of a process to select the Appellate Body members. This is carried forward by the Trump administration. With a Settlement of Disputes Understanding (DSU) requirement that appeals be heard by three AB members, with the AB membership down to zero at the present time..

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上，美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜，混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件，美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述，單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議，以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例，試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例，美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..