在新回合農業談判中，現有糧食援助規範是否會產生商業排擠與間接出口補貼效果引起許多爭論。本文由《過剩處理與諮商義務之原則》出發，探討其與 WTO 談判之關連性，並剖析對我國的影響與因應之道。本文發現未來 WTO 對於糧食援助之要求將轉趨嚴格，我國的「糧食人道援外作業要點」原則上雖符合 WTO 未來新規範之方向，但在規範的陳述與對糧援類型的定義上仍略有差異。為了確保我國糧食援外工作得以持續推展，我國必須在談判中爭取實物糧援於非緊急情況時得以實施，以及糧援需求評估..

During the WTO Doha Round agricultural negotiations, there are many debates about whether the existing food aid rules are responsible for creating commercial displacement and indirect export subsidy effects. This study begins with investigating the relationship between the “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations” and the WTO negotiations, followed by exploring the implications of new WTO disciplines on Taiwan’s food aid policies. We find that the negotiation is working toward more effect..

美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上，美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜，混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件，美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述，單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議，以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例，試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例，美國..

How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..