作為德國歷史上的第一個民主政體─威瑪共和從誕生開始就是一個「生病的民主」,也是一個「沒有民主人的民主」。威瑪憲法的制定者除了架構起所謂的「程序性民主」之外,同時更在議會制的基礎上賦予民選的總統強大的權力─半總統制,加上欠缺民主文化,以及存在著反體制的政黨,致令威瑪憲法像是特洛伊木馬。最後在議會政治失敗的亂局中,希特勒(Adolf Hitler)率領納粹黨徒從木馬中一躍而出,用原本是保護民主的權力將民主政體合法地謀殺掉。
二戰後的聯邦德國痛定思痛,記取威瑪共和失敗的經驗,雙管齊下,重建民主。其除了在基本法中採用議會制的憲政體制和建設性不信任投票的機制外,更增列對違反民主原則或意圖推翻民主憲政體制的政黨之處罰規定,建立起所謂的「防禦性民主」。另外,大規模的政治文化改造運動,民主文化被有計畫地塑造,加上戰後聯邦德國的經濟持續繁榮,產生了大量的中產階級,除了有利於民主文化的出現,也導致政黨體系集中化與穩定化。在制度輸出面「產出效果」(output effect)的有利基礎上,再進一步創造「制度效果」(system effect),終於成就了聯邦德國民主化的成功。
As the first democracy in German history, the Weimar Republic was “a sick democracy”, and “a democracy without democrats” ever since it was born. The composers of the Weimar Constitution not only constructed a so-called “procedural democracy”, but also gave the extreme power to the people-elected president – semi-presidentialism – based on the foundation of parliamentary system. Furthermore, accompanied with a political climate that lacked democratic culture and existing parties that were essentially against the system, the Weimar Constitution failed to assume its power to protect the democracy, and eventually it became a Trojan horse by which Adolf Hitler utilized to legally murder democracy during the parliamentary chaos.
After WWII, Federal Germany learned from the lesson of failure from the Weimar Republic and tried to reconstruct democracy by two measures: adopting the constitutional system of parliamentarism under the basic law and the mechanism of constructive vote of non-confidence, and implementing punitive rules to regulate any parties that violate the democratic principles or have the intention to overturn the democratic constitutional system – the so-called “defensive democracy.” Moreover, large-scale political culture reforms and the emergence of a large middle class resulted from continuous economic prosperity of the post-war Federal Germany not only benefited the rising of democratic culture, but also concentrated and stabilized party systems. The fact of further creation of the “system effect” based on favorable systematic “output effect” had thus achieved the success of Federal Germany’s democratization.
法國與臺灣的政府體制都屬於半總統制,法國的憲政經驗中曾出現過三次的「左右共治」,臺灣的憲政經驗中卻從未出現過「藍綠共治」,何以如此?這是本文欲探討的課題。本文藉助賽局理論作為分析工具,探討制度安排如何影響行動者間的策略互動,以致最後產生了共治與否的差異。法國與臺灣擁有不同的選舉制度和不同的國會保障機制,在兩種制度因素的交互作用下,會引導分屬不同政黨陣營的總統和國會多數產生不同的政治計算與策略互動,最終導致法國出現「左右共治」,臺灣卻沒有出現「藍綠共治」。 ..
Both France and Taiwan’s political systems are semi-presidential. However, “cohabitation” in French constitutional experience has occurred three times while Taiwan has never seen “cohabitation” until now. Finding the reason for this difference is the central question of this paper. By using the game theory as an analysis tool, the paper explores how the institutional design influences the actors’ strategic interactions, which underlies the discrepancy between France and Taiwan in “coh..
本文的目的在於探討蜜月期選舉時程如何在半總統制下,對前三大政黨在國會選舉時的表現,產生不同於在總統制下所產生的影響。本文認為,由於總統制與半總統制的權力分立程度不同,所以導引出來的蜜月期選舉效應也就相異。根據既有文獻可知,在總統制下,因為權力完全分立,總統黨與第三黨在以具有比例性的選制所進行的蜜月期國會大選中會選得比較好,但本文認為這個效應無法類推到半總統制國家。在半總統制下,因為權力只有部分分立,國會大選是行政權選舉的第二階段,所以即便在蜜月期選舉時程中,..
This paper aims at exploring how semi-presidentialism differs from presidentialism in affecting electoral performance of three largest parties in honeymoon elections. This paper argues that different levels of power separation in presidentialism and semi-presidentialism explain why the effects of honeymoon elections vary. Many existent studies indicated that in presidential systems, with total power separation, the largest and the third largest parties would gain in honeymoon elections that used proportional electoral systems..
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