在美國歷史上所簽訂的 14 項 FTA 中，NAFTA 與 CAFTA-DR 最能展現總統與國會在 FTA 政策制訂上所扮演角色與影響決策的程度，故本文以此兩項 FTA 作為研究美國 FTA 決策主體的案例。研究發現，在對外政策的決策主體的三種不同的模式:總統主導模式、國會主導模式與互動模式中，總統模式最能解釋美國 FTA 政策。總統具有龐大的國內外行政資源與政黨力量，可以干預國會的決策並改變個別議員的投票傾向，在不影響 FTA 基本內涵與目的下促使國會通過 FTA。國會制訂的程序規範不足以限制行政部門的權力;除了最終的投票權，國會的影響力僅存在於洽簽時介入修改某些條款，而這些條款的改變仍需要行政部門的認可。這種由行政部門主導，國會僅能在不影響 FTA 根本的前提上修改部分的條款，明顯的符合總統主導模式。
Among all 14 FTA’s signed by the U.S. in history, NAFTA and CAFTA-DR - selected by this paper as cases to identify the entity that owns the power of dominating the U.S. FTA policy - most represent the dynamics and impacts of President and Congress on the FTA policy formation. The research shows that among the three models of decision-making entities of foreign policy - President, Congress, and Interaction, the President model best explains the decision-making of FTA policies. President controls enormous external and internal administrative resources and party leverage to interfere with the Congress decision-making and change the voting behavior of individual congressman, resulting in the passage of FTA’s in Congress without undermining its foundation. Regulations created by Congress do not generate meaningful effects on constraining President’s power. In addition to the showdown on final voting, Congress’ influence is only limited to slightly modifying contents of agreements mostly in the stage of negotiation, which also requires approval from the Administration. This is apparently consistent with the arguments of the President model.
2008 年 9 月，美國、玻利維亞及委內瑞拉三國爆發令周邊國家擔憂的嚴重外交衝突事件。這個緊張情勢雖然在三方決定自我克制的情況下，除了相互驅逐大使，情勢並未惡化，但三方何以採取如此克制的作為，是筆者欲在本文探討的議題。本文利用傑維斯(Robert Jervis)1976年書中所提出決策者的認知、對他國意向的解讀、敵意的高低等認知心理途徑的核心概念，檢視 2008 年美、玻、委三國外交衝突事件中，三方究竟本於何種的利益考量或計算，才做出相互克制以緩解衝突的決..
In September 2008, there was a serious diplomatic confrontation involving the United States, Bolivia, and Venezuela that alarmed other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The decision to exercise self-restraint on all sides meant that action was limited to the mutual expulsion of ambassadors and the crisis did not escalate. In this paper, the author studies why the three countries exercised such self-restraint. Robert Jervis’ core concepts of policymakers’ perceptions, the understanding of other countries’ ..
本文探討半總統制下的立法課責，以臺灣與法國為個案進行比較研究。「立法課責」指如何讓立法者(集體或個別)的所作所為能為利害關係人知道，而據以獎懲。過去比較臺、法的研究發現，總理總統制的法國，國會的運作型態較偏內閣制;總統議會制的臺灣，運作則較偏總統制，因而在傳統印象上，多會認為法國會較重視以政黨為對象的集體課責，臺灣則可能較偏重以候選人或立委為對象的個別課責。 本文乃透過制度規範上對選舉前與選舉後的資訊公開要求，比較臺灣與法國在集體課責與個別課..
This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s p..
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