1965 年「解決國家與他國國民間投資爭端公約」創設國際投資爭端解決中心，建立以仲裁程序為主的投資人對地主國爭端解決機制，投資人無須仰賴母國行使外交保護權，得遂行投資人對地主國仲裁以落實國際投資條約之實體保障。惟對跨國投資之中小企業而言，鉅額仲裁費用形成仲裁利用途徑之障礙，不但妨礙中小企業投資保障實體權益之落實，更可能衝擊國際投資爭端解決機制去政治化之發展。國際投資仲裁程序費用，如仲裁機構規費，仲裁庭費用與法律服務費用，動輒達百萬美元以上。中小企業可能無力承..

The 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and affirmed the use of international arbitration as primary means for resolving disputes between foreign investors and host states. An aggrieved foreign investor no longer needs to rely upon its home state to invoke diplomatic protection once local remedies are exhausted in the host state, but could proceed with investor..

國家機關(the State)是否利用國家資源干預市場(the Market)、國家機關是否應選擇某些特定產業加以扶植(selective policy)?這些投入資源是否能被有效達成發展的目的?是政治經濟學界有關「新古典經濟學派」與 「發展型國家學派」爭辯的焦點。在東協國家中，同樣自 1970 年代發展汽車產業，為何泰國與馬來西亞的汽車產業發展出現差距?差距是否源自國家機關與產業政策互動的結果?本研究藉由探討馬來西亞與泰國汽車產業的發展歷程，試圖比較與論證..

Whether should the state interfere the market by using state resources? Should the state cultivate certain industries? Does the state resources work to help the state achieve developmental goals? These are the arguments between the ‘New Classical Economics School’ and the ‘National Development School’. Automobile industries in both Thailand and Malaysia developed in the 1970s with governmental interference but the development in the two countries diverged. Does the difference come from the interactions..