期刊內容 Issue content

美國總統公布對臺軍售的時機選擇: 行政部門通知國會審查的分析
The President’s Choice of Timing for Arms Sales to Taiwan: An Analysis of the Executive Branch’s Notification to Congress for Review
陳偉華(Wei-hua Chen)
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59卷3期(2020/09/01)
自我國與美國斷交後，過去40年來，美國政府對臺軍售始終為美國作為兩岸關係第三方影響的重要課題，亦為在兩岸間「衝突預防」的政策工具。美國對於臺灣的安全承諾，長期擺盪在安全利益與民主聲譽之間，亦根源於行政部門和國會之間的立場分野。有別於過去的分析途徑，本文從外交政策分析(FPA)的理論視角切入，以總統決策機制為分析單元，討論美國總統在對臺軍售決策機制中究竟扮演的關鍵角色，以總統任期、領導人安全觀及府會結構三項解釋變數，檢視歷屆美國總統對於公布軍售和「通知國會審查」的時機選擇，系統性觀測當中的變異現象。本文進一步分析小布希與歐巴馬總統在任期內不同階段對臺軍售的考量因素，進行追蹤比較，期望可以從美國總統決策視角，釐清美國對臺軍售的主要影響變數。
 
 

 

Since the United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the U.S arms sales to Taiwan have been a critical issue affecting the Cross-Strait relations for the past 40 years. In order to preserve stability in the Taiwan Strait, maintaining sufficient self-defense capability for Taiwan has been the major goal of the United States. However, the U.S security commitment to Taiwan has long been fluctuating between security interests and democratic reputation. It also depends on the stance of the executive branch and of the Congress. This article starts from the theoretical perspective of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and uses the presidential decision-making mechanism as an analysis unit to discuss the U.S president’s dominant role in the arms sales to Taiwan. Based on the three explanatory variables of the President’s term of office - the leader’s “threat perceptions,” the type of governments in presidential systems, and the executive-legislative relationship, the article examines U.S presidents’ choices on the timing of their consideration to make announcements of arms sales to Taiwan and “notifications to Congress for review.” This article further analyzes the considerations of President George W. Bush’s and President Obama ’s arms sales to Taiwan at different stages.
 
Hopefully this paper will provide a better understanding of important factors that influence decision making of arms sales to Taiwan.
 

 

總統決策機制對臺軍售中美關係臺美關係國會審查 Presidential Decision-making Mechanism US Arms Sales to Taiwan U.S.-Taiwan Relations U.S.-China Relations Congressional Review Process

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