As one of the distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in the world, Taiwan is not able to participate in or access the works of many international organizations, including regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), due to the fact that Taiwan’s statehood is not recognized by the United Nations and most States. The term “Fishing Entities” was created in the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), in which it has also opened a window of opportunity for Taiwan in the participation of international organizations. However, both procedures applicable to and rights enjoyed by Taiwan under the capacity of a “Fishing Entity” vary in different time periods and RFMOs.
After analysis, in the early stage procedures applied to and rights enjoyed by a Fishing Entity and a Contracting Party are almost the same in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropic Tuna Commission (IATTC). However, in RFMOs that Taiwan has just recently become Members, Taiwan continues to enjoy rights and procedures similar to those of WCPFC in the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) because of the strong assistance from the United States. But in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (SPRFMO), procedures applied to and rights enjoyed by a Fishing Entity are significantly less and restricted than those in the previous three organizations. In addition, Taiwan was only allowed to participate as a “Special Observer” when negotiating in the SPRFMO Convention, in which high seas boarding and inspection (HSBI) procedures also only apply to Contracting Parties.
In conclusion, procedures applied to and rights enjoyed by Fishing Entity in RFMOs seem more and more restricted recently, and the gap between a Fishing Entity and a Contracting Party gradually moves further apart. As a strong DWFN, such developmental tendency will inevitably affect rights enjoyed by Taiwan when participating in new RFMOs in the future, and should thus be worthy of continued attention.
過去的研究指出在 1996 至 2008 年臺灣四次總統選舉中，認同是一個影響選民投票抉擇的重要因素，在 2012 年的總統選舉中，認同是否仍然為一個重要的影響因素，是本文的主要探討問題。本文首先從認同理論的界限設定觀點，討論臺灣認同的階段，提出臺灣認同已從第一階段的「省籍」對立，到第二階段的「臺灣意識/中國意識」之爭，而在兩岸恢復交流後，因為認同界限的改變(臺灣 vs.中國)，進入到第三階段的「國家認同」層次。在第三個階段，臺灣與中國之間存在文化聯繫與政治..
Previous studies show that identity is an important factor in voting choice in the past four Taiwanese presidential elections between 1996 and 2008. This paper aims to explore whether identity still retains its impact on voting choice in the 2012 presidential election. The author starts with the discussion on the development of the Taiwan identity. Theoretically, identity can be regarded as a type of boundary setting and its development includes three stages. The first stage is the distinction between Benshengren and Mainland..
1970 年代研究三角關係的專家塔圖(Michel Tatu)指出，美、中、蘇 「三者之一欲激起另兩方同謀之必然方式，為展現過度侵略性」。本文以塔圖之分析，探討 1979 年以來美臺軍事、政治與經貿關係之演變。由過去美、中、臺三角關係之互動，可以看出以下的特性:(1)中國對臺有過度侵略性的舉止，如 1996 年臺海危機，美國主動強化美臺軍事關係，增加美臺合作的空間;(2)在中國壓力下，國際組織有過度的舉止，如 2007 年聯合國秘書長潘基文謬誤解讀臺灣地位，..
Michel Tatu, an expert on US-China-USSR relations, observed in 1970 that “the surest way for any of the three to provoke the other two into collusion is to display undue aggressiveness.” This study analyses US- Taiwan relations in light of Tatu’s assumption. The interactions of US- Taiwan-China relations since 1979 are marked by the following features: (1)When China acts with undue aggressiveness against Taiwan – as for example in the 1996 missile crisis which prompted the US to dispatch two aircraft c..
Please enter the journal title, keywords, and author-related information you want to query.