傳統國際關係研究在討論霸權的相關課題時,多是探索霸權相對權力優勢的消長,認為失去權力優勢的霸權,將難逃新興國家的挑戰,霸權交替萌起於無可避免的霸權戰爭。國關學界依順國際政治是一種權力競爭的思路,多是以物質權力作為評量霸權的基準,相對忽視權威暨治理正當性等因素在構成霸業的作用,進而忽略霸權領導的治理權威,霸權如何維繫霸業的討論,更限縮在有限的強制宰制,忽視正當性對強化霸權統御的作用。
本文試圖檢驗權威在霸權治理過程中所扮演的角色與作用,以為霸業更迭是國際治理權威的轉換,它不單是涉及相對權力優勢的取得,更需取得被支配國家的服從,以及霸權治理的正當性。本文首先將評析領導視角下的霸權與霸業,其次論述權威在霸權治理的構成,第三部分討論治理權威與權力優勢在維繫霸業的相互作用,最後回顧美國的霸權治理,希冀能勾勒出霸權治理權威消長的完整面貌。
IR studies on hegemony have paid much attention on the relative decline and uprising of powers, which has constituted the perspective that the factors of uneven-growth will cause the downfall of hegemony and the rising power will replace the old one after the former poses great challenges to the declining hegemon and wins the hegemonic war. Though the term of hegemony has deeply implied the characters of leadership, IR generally defines the hegemony as an international order within which one state constitute her dominance with power supremacy. Little discussion has ever been engaged to issues about how the hegemon constitute the ruling authority in her way to maintaining her global leadership.
This paper tries to demonstrate the role and effects of hegemonic authority. It argues that the shifting of hegemonic power is the transition of international authority of hegemonic governance. It refers not only to the possessing of relative power superiority, but also the consent of subordinated states, as well as the legitimate grounds of hegemonic ruling. The first part of this paper will define the hegemony from the perspective of leadership. The construction of hegemonic authority is the second part. The third part presents the interactive relationships between the power supremacy and the authority in the hegemony. The historical reviews on the US hegemonic governance in the past years will constitute the final part of this paper. It concludes that much research on the hegemonic authority will provide a fresh point to the causes and effects about the rise and fall of hegemony.
在議會內閣制下,聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題,而許多學者也同意,政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說,參與聯合政府的政黨 ,有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論,再透過相關的文獻回顧,檢視在共同治理的過程中,有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為,以及這些制度的成效。最後,本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向,提出簡單的幾個建議。
While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the ins..
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