As one of the distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in the world, Taiwan is not able to participate in or access the works of many international organizations, including regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), due to the fact that Taiwan’s statehood is not recognized by the United Nations and most States. The term “Fishing Entities” was created in the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), in which it has also opened a window of opportunity for Taiwan in the participation of international organizations. However, both procedures applicable to and rights enjoyed by Taiwan under the capacity of a “Fishing Entity” vary in different time periods and RFMOs.
After analysis, in the early stage procedures applied to and rights enjoyed by a Fishing Entity and a Contracting Party are almost the same in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropic Tuna Commission (IATTC). However, in RFMOs that Taiwan has just recently become Members, Taiwan continues to enjoy rights and procedures similar to those of WCPFC in the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) because of the strong assistance from the United States. But in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (SPRFMO), procedures applied to and rights enjoyed by a Fishing Entity are significantly less and restricted than those in the previous three organizations. In addition, Taiwan was only allowed to participate as a “Special Observer” when negotiating in the SPRFMO Convention, in which high seas boarding and inspection (HSBI) procedures also only apply to Contracting Parties.
In conclusion, procedures applied to and rights enjoyed by Fishing Entity in RFMOs seem more and more restricted recently, and the gap between a Fishing Entity and a Contracting Party gradually moves further apart. As a strong DWFN, such developmental tendency will inevitably affect rights enjoyed by Taiwan when participating in new RFMOs in the future, and should thus be worthy of continued attention.
This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s p..
1970 年代研究三角關係的專家塔圖(Michel Tatu)指出，美、中、蘇 「三者之一欲激起另兩方同謀之必然方式，為展現過度侵略性」。本文以塔圖之分析，探討 1979 年以來美臺軍事、政治與經貿關係之演變。由過去美、中、臺三角關係之互動，可以看出以下的特性:(1)中國對臺有過度侵略性的舉止，如 1996 年臺海危機，美國主動強化美臺軍事關係，增加美臺合作的空間;(2)在中國壓力下，國際組織有過度的舉止，如 2007 年聯合國秘書長潘基文謬誤解讀臺灣地位，..
Michel Tatu, an expert on US-China-USSR relations, observed in 1970 that “the surest way for any of the three to provoke the other two into collusion is to display undue aggressiveness.” This study analyses US- Taiwan relations in light of Tatu’s assumption. The interactions of US- Taiwan-China relations since 1979 are marked by the following features: (1)When China acts with undue aggressiveness against Taiwan – as for example in the 1996 missile crisis which prompted the US to dispatch two aircraft c..
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