東協各國政府廣泛地認為，南海爭端是冷戰後東南亞主要的「衝突引爆點」。它也對東協的團結及其有關和平解決爭端的規範帶來了嚴峻的考驗。由於並非所有東協成員國都是南海島礁的聲索國，因此，東協對南海的共識與立場始終受到各國在南海不同利益的影響而罕有「一致性」，而東協決策的模式也顯示其南海政策立場的結構性問題。對南海衝突管理與海域劃界涉及的東協會員國至少有越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞與汶萊，印尼和新加坡的立場也值得關注。本文目的是探討作為一個整體的東協，如何回應南海緊張局勢的升高。雖然東協「共識」(consensus)的程度似乎在制定《東協憲章》 (ASEAN Charter)已經有所進步，但共識仍受到現實政治的限制。本文主要討論「南海各方行為宣言」(Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, DOC)和「南海行為準則」(Code of Conduct on the South China Sea, COC)的發展進程，以及東協對於菲律賓提出「和平、自由、友誼與合作區」(Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation, ZOPFFC) 的回應。

The South China Sea(SCS)dispute was widely viewed by ASEAN governments as the major ‘flashpoint of conflict’ in the post-Cold War Southeast Asia. It also posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and of its norms concerning peaceful settlements of disputes. Because not all ASEAN member countries are the claim countries of the SCS islands and reefs, therefore, the consensus and position of ASEAN on the SCS have always been rare "consistency" due to different interests in the SCS. ASEAN decision-making style also shows structural problems of its policy stance in the SCS. ASEAN members on conflict management in the SCS and the maritime delimitation involve at least Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei; Indonesia and Singapore’s positions are also noteworthy. The purpose of this paper is to explore how ASEAN as a whole responds to the rise of tensions in the SCS. Although the extent of the ASEAN consensus seems to make progress in the development of the ASEAN Charter, consensus is still subject to the limitations of political realities. This article focuses on the developmental process of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea(DOC)and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea(COC), and the ASEAN responses to the Philippines’ zone of peace, Freedom, friendship and cooperation(ZOPFFC)initiative.