國家間發生領土爭端時，常以展現或威脅使用軍事力量為主要威逼手段，若爭端國互不相讓，往往會陷入緊張的軍事對峙，隨時可能升級為全面武裝衝突。本文檢視此類不實際動武的軍事對峙，並提出兩個因素可有助緩和軍事對峙。首先，反覆僵持的爭端使雙方主動管理對峙行為，避免容易造成衝突升級的意外;再者，未定邊界或領土為雙方使用武力的緩衝地帶，針對爭議領土展示或威脅使用武力變成可理解的經常事件，對爭端國而言，爭議區域的武裝對峙或軍事行動不被視為立即的挑戰或威脅，衝突方傾向避免對峙惡..

States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territo..

2005年，印度與中國建立了「戰略合作夥伴關係」(strategic cooperative partnership)，給予外界中印關係改善的印象。在現實情況中，中印的戰略夥伴關係呈現出在安全與經濟上的落差，較類似兩個原本敵意深重的發展中國家，為了經濟發展所進行的策略聯盟，以經濟發展為重，而與安全合作及解決主權與邊界爭議較無關。本文從決策者進行合作時的利益與成本考量的角度，探討中印「戰略夥伴關係」的發展前景。中印建構戰略夥伴關係，是決..

In 2005, China and India established a “strategic cooperative partnership,” which led to rising optimism about China-India relations. This article discusses prospects of the China-India strategic partnership from the perspective of benefit and cost. The China-India strategic partnership is regarded as an attempt by the leaders of the two countries to change bilateral relations from non-cooperation to cooperation. The key to successful transformation lies in the fact that decision makers of both sides can recognize..