在議會內閣制下,聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題,而許多學者也同意,政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說,參與聯合政府的政黨 ,有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論,再透過相關的文獻回顧,檢視在共同治理的過程中,有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為,以及這些制度的成效。最後,本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向,提出簡單的幾個建議。
While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the ins..
日本政府分別於 2001 年與 2009 年兩度改革預算制度,都是在內閣層級設立新的組織,移轉部分預算編列權限到內閣,希望透過改變編列預算的方式,來提高首相與內閣領導力,並解決各省廳的本位問題。前者是在內閣府設立經財政諮詢會議,後者則是分別在內閣官房與內閣府設立國家戰略室與行政刷新會議。儘管小泉內閣時期,透過經濟財政諮詢會議改革原有的預算編列方式,也成功地刪減財政支出,以及民主黨執政初期,行政刷新會議做出刪減預算的決定,國家戰略室也有設定降低財政赤字的目標,..
The Japanese government reformed its budget institutions and budget processes in 2001 and 2009, establishing the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy(CEFP)in 2001, and the National Strategy Office(NSO)and the Government Revitalization Unit(GRU)in 2009. By moving the Ministry of Finance’s budget formulation authority to the Cabinet, it was expected that these new institutions would facilitate the prime minister’s leadership. However, despite institutional changes, the budget formulation processes and the existing ..
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