本文主要從日本政治經濟結構當中非正式制度的轉變來探討 1990 年之後日本經濟衰退的主要原因。在過去分析日本經濟衰退的原因大多是從國際層次與國內層次兩個面向來分析，在國際層次方面包括自由化的衝擊與日圓的急遽升值;在國內層次方面則包括政府主導模式的失調與規制緩和的調控，而這些面向主要焦點都集中在國際化與自由化的轉變對日本國內政經制度的衝擊，而忽略日本國內制度轉型的重要性。本文認為在過去這些文獻探討大多集中在日本正式制度的調整，而忽視非正式制度的存在與轉變。本文..

The goal of this paper is to explore the roots of Japanese economic recession in the 1990s from the transition of informal institutions in Japan. In the past, analysis of the Japanese economic recession in the 1990s was used to the aspect of international dimension and domestic dimension; focuses on the formal institutions such as political reform, fiscal reform, administrational reform, and financial reform, and neglected the changes of informal institutions. The argument of this paper bases on the fact that Japan has reform..

 在議會內閣制下，聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題，而許多學者也同意，政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說，參與聯合政府的政黨 ，有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論，再透過相關的文獻回顧，檢視在共同治理的過程中，有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為，以及這些制度的成效。最後，本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向，提出簡單的幾個建議。

While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the ins..