半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..

本文回顧近年來政治經濟發展的研究。文中處理兩個主要的議題，第一個是國家在經濟發展中的角色，包括產業政策以及經濟自由化政策。產業政策部分討論贏家挑選政策、產業政策實踐上的差異、技術官僚與統治者之間的關係、影響發展途徑選擇的結構性因素，以及近年來發展型國家的轉型。其次，發展國家論的著重在工業政策，對經濟自由化政策常以經濟發展的另一種選項視之。本文討論國家如何交互使用這兩項政策，另外也分析影響經濟改革推動的制度與結構性因素。挑選贏家的過程中需將資源分配到最有潛力的部門，經濟自由化改革也需移除壟..

We review two important topics in the field of political and economic development. We discuss how states employ industrial policies and economic liberalization to promote economic development. Within the industrial policy framework, we delve into the issues of choosing winners, difference in industrial policy implementations, the relationship between technocracy and the rulers, structural factors that affect industrial policy choices, and the transformations of developmental states in recent years. Secondly, the debates surrounding developm..