1997 年 12 月聯合國氣候變化綱要公約的京都議定書問世以來，各國的履行狀況各異:有些國家選擇履行，有些國家選擇不履行;有些國家履行的步調迅速，有些國家履行的步調緩慢。本文運用關係締約途徑，從剩餘控制權利與全球環境治理結構、交易成本與全球環境治理結構調適等面向，分析影響各國履行的因素。

全球環境治理結構愈是偏向行動者剩餘控制權利懸殊的階層關係，各行動者所須付出的治理成本愈高，愈偏好傾向無政府關係的全球環境治理結構，以降低治理成本;另一方面，全球環境治理結構愈是偏向行動者剩餘控制權利相若的無政府關係，各行動者所須付出的機會主義預期成本愈高，愈偏好傾向階層關係的全球環境治理結構，以降低機會主義預期成本。

Due to the presence of states’ various implementing conditions of Kyoto Protocol since December 1997, this essay intends to analyze the factors through dimensions of rights of residual control, global environmental governance structure, transaction cost, and the adaptation of global environmental governance structure from relational contracting approaches.

Actors tend to choose more anarchical relations of global environmental governance structure to decrease high governance costs resulted from hierarchical relations of global environmental governance structure; in the other hand, actors tend to choose more hierarchical relations of global environmental governance structure to decrease high expected costs of opportunism resulted from anarchical relations of global environmental governance structure.