國家間發生領土爭端時，常以展現或威脅使用軍事力量為主要威逼手段，若爭端國互不相讓，往往會陷入緊張的軍事對峙，隨時可能升級為全面武裝衝突。本文檢視此類不實際動武的軍事對峙，並提出兩個因素可有助緩和軍事對峙。首先，反覆僵持的爭端使雙方主動管理對峙行為，避免容易造成衝突升級的意外;再者，未定邊界或領土為雙方使用武力的緩衝地帶，針對爭議領土展示或威脅使用武力變成可理解的經常事件，對爭端國而言，爭議區域的武裝對峙或軍事行動不被視為立即的挑戰或威脅，衝突方傾向避免對峙惡化而升級為全面武裝衝突，即使發生武裝衝突，也可能侷限於爭端地區。在長年有爭端的地區，爭端國缺乏升級武力奪取領土的動機，武力威逼的目的在於表達並捍衛對領土歸屬的立場，因此雙方都有意限制衝突的規模。本文以2017年解放軍與印度軍隊在洞朗地區的軍事對峙為例，以上述因素探討該事件得以和平落幕的因素，未來中印類似的邊界軍事紛爭升級。

 

States often make coercive threats by showing or threatening to use military force during territorial disputes. Disputants may be mired in intense military standoff if no parties would stand down in a dispute. The tense situation may escalate into armed conflicts. This article examines military standoff short of the use of force. It presents two variables that could alleviate military standoff. First, disputants will take measures to manage their conflict behavior when repeated conflicts yield no clear resolution to a territorial dispute. Such measures aim to avoid accidents that contribute to further escalation. Second, unsettled border or territories serve as a buffer zone for the use of force. The show of force or signaling military threat becomes a frequent event accepted by both disputants. They do not deem military confrontation in the disputed territory as an immediate security challenge or threat. They will, therefore, prevent further deterioration of a military standoff and avoid the escalation of armed conflicts. Disputants lack incentives to escalate the use of force to capture a piece of territory that has been subjected to dispute for a long time. Military coercion usually aims at signaling and defending the disputant’s claim on the sovereignty of the disputed territory. Therefore, disputants are likely to constrain the level of armed conflicts. Hence, this paper examines the military standoff between Chinese and Indian armies in Doklam in the year 2017, and shows that the variables above contribute to the peaceful resolution of the standoff.